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 om P. MTI-ZELPLN, P.e. 
2 13 N. Street 
Coew d' Alene, Idaho 83 8 14 
Tele: (208) 664-5891 
Fax: (208) 664-2240 
ISB# 6083 
IN THE DISTMCT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTmCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHIO, ICN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENM 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING 
COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS P. LAV?RE??CE and 
BRENDA J.  LAV?RENCE, Husband 
and Wife 
Defendants. 
1 CASE NO. CV-02-07671 
1 
) AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS 
1 LA NCE IN SUPPORT OF 
1 OPPOSITION TO E N E W D  
1 MOTION FOR 






STATE OF IDAHO 1 
) ss. 
County of Kootenai 1 
I, Douglas P. Lawrence, after being duly sworn upon my oath, depose and say: 
1. I make this Afiidavit of my own personal knowledge. 1 am over the age of 18. I am 
knowledgeable of the facts and issues regarding this matter and am competent to testify to the 
facts contained in this affidavit. It is true and conect to the best of my knowledge. 
2. My wife and I purchased the property which is the subject of this complaint in July 1996. 
We have now owned the subject property for over eleven years. During the time that we have 
been in possession of this properb-y, I have made comtless visits to the subject properhy for 
puposes of gathering firewood, logging, repairing gates, posting signs, photograpf?y, cmping, 
repairing vanddism and dmage  to propeq,  clearing roads, recreational uses, etc. I have made 
numerous explorations thoughout the south half of Section 2 1, the west half of Section 22, and 
the Southwest quarter of Section 15. I m very familiar with the trails and roads that exist in the 
above described area. 
3. My wife and I were sued in 1998 by North American Cellular over the Apple Blossom 
Road as it crosses our proper@. Since then, we have also been sued by AT&T, Kootenai Electric, 
Verizon, Capstar, and Nextel; all for the same reasons. Because of these lawsuits, I have had to 
perform hours of research at the Kootenai County Recorders Office; personally researching all 
the deeds, titles, and conveyances regarding the subject property as well as the plaintiffs 
property. I have personally reviewed every track sheet as well as every recorded instrument for 
the above described land. I have reviewed every land conveyance since the issuance of the 
original land patent signed by President William Howard Taft over 100 years ago. I have also 
reviewed the historical records regarding Signal Point and Mellick Roads. I have reviewed every 
Conditional Use Permit and building permit that the Kootenai County Planning and Zoning 
Department has issued for the Southwest quarter of Section 22 since the institution of zoning 
laws in Kootenai County. I have also personally met with and made inquiries of employees of 
Idaho Forest Industries, Wilber Mead, John Mack, Harold Funk and a Licensed Surveyor 
regarding the historical use of the road. Recently, I was present at the deposition of Harold Funk, 
J o h  Rook, and Capstar. H do not believe any other person living has invested as much time, 
energy, or expense in studying t h s  road or can speak with the sane authoritgi. 
4. At the time Harold Funk purchased his land, he had a legal ingress/egress to his land via 
Me'llick road as it crossed his land in Section 15 A private road that Harold Funk identif ed as a 
logging road in his deposition, extended from MelEick Road, through Section 22 and joined into 
Apple Blossom Road2. 
5. The public records reveal that neither Harold Funk nor h s  predecessors in interest in the 
lands he o w e d  ever obtained a legal in~ess/egress to Signal Point road across the road now 
identified as Apple Blossom Road. There are no records to indicate that Pike Reynolds or the 
Radens and Marcoes used any other ingresslegress other than Mellick Road. 
6. GTE built the first structure in the southwest quarter of Section 22 on or about 1 966. 
Public records reveal that GTE did obtain a right of way to Signal Point road in 1966. The right 
of ways that GTE obtained, only benefited the land that GTE had acquired. These right of ways 
did not benefit any other lands. 
7. The Funks purchased the land laying in Sections 15,2 1, and 22 on or about 1 9693. From 
1969 until the Funks sold the subject property to H m a n  Synergistics in 1975, they used the 
Apple Blossom road a couple of times per year for a total of 20-30 times over an approximately 
six year period4. Furthermore, when the Funks did use the road, they used it to access their 
property in the Southwest quarter of Section 21 and only rarely did they use it to cross the 
Defendants' land5. 
8. Harold F d  moved to AlberdeerdArnerican Falls in 1975 and for all practical purposes, 
h s  use of the road ceased6. From 1975 until he sold his last remaining interest in his land to John 
Mack in 1992, a period spanning some 17 years, he made only a total of 2-3 visits to his land in 
Section 227. 
9. Hmold FLU& conveyed the Defendmts' land to Human Synergistics Witbln a f e ~  months 
of moving hmself to Alberdeeri'American Falls8. Mrs. Funk moved away from the area in the 
spring of 1 97G9. There i s  no evidence that bbs. Funk ever drove to their properly herself. 
B 0. Prior to the creation of the Defendant" parcel, the only land s m e r s  in the Southwest 
qumer of Section 22 were GTE and the F d s .  There were no other land o w e r s  and GTE had 
the only structure. GTE w s  the only enti.ty using the road as it crossed the Defendants' land on a 
regular basis and they were the only Iand o m e r  with an easement to S ipa l  Point road. 
l 1, m e n  Harold F d  sold the Defendmts' laad to H m a n  Synergistics, the land did not 
have a legal ingresslegess to Signal Point road. It did not have a liegal ingresslegress when 
Ifman Synergistics sold it to the Johnsons and McHughs in May 1976. The severance of the 
Defendants' land from the original FLU& estate did not cause the retained lands to be separated 
from the highway and did not cause a necessity. 
12. In July 1976, the Johnsons and McHughs did obtain a legal ingresslegress to Signal 
Point roadi0. This easement only benefited their land and did not benefit the lands still owned by 
the Funks in Section 22". When the Johnsons and Mcf-lughs obtained this easement, the only 
other entity using the road was GTE as the Funks were living in Alberdeedherican Falls by 
tlus timei2. 
13. There is no evidence that the Funks intended to make pemanent, any use across the 
Defendants' land. The Funks only drove across the Defendants' land a couple of times. And, had 
they intended the use to be permanent, the Funks would have obtained the necessary easements 
across the other lands so they had a legal ingresslegress from the Defendants' land to Signal 
Point road. 
14. The Funks pwchased an easement from Wilber Mead in order to access their land lying 
in the Southwest quarter of Section 2 1 ". This fact is supported by Harold Funk's o w  "lstimonjr 
in his deposition, together with the language which was used to create the easement which states: 
"Easementfor ingress and egress over existing road to andporn ~Wicvowave station lying utilhin 
15. The plaintiff has offered no evidence to show that they benefit &om any easement 
across any of the other lands they must traverse to reach Signal Point road. 
16. l drove my personal vehicle from the subject property to East Riverview road by 
traveling a private logging road that comects to Mellick Road on at least 20 occasions since 
2, 
about f 996 or 1997. This road is well depicted on a Metsker map dated March 1959 and having 
personally driven this road many times, I believe the Metsker map represents Mellick road quite 
3 
reasonablyi5. This is the same road that Harold Funk marked as a logging road on Exkubit 2 of 
4 
his depositioni6. Attached and included as E A b i t  1 is Google Earth imagery denoting the 
: 
location of Mellick road together with photography that I personally shot. The yellow place 
6 
markers in the Coogle Earth Imagery depict the roadway. The numbering of the place makers 
7 
corresponds to the individual photographs that were taken at those locations. The layout of this 
road closely resembles the layout of the road as it appears in Exhibit 2 of the Funk Deposition. 
17. The earliest date I can recall of using Mellick Road was in either 1996 or 1997. The 
road was a bit narrow and overgrown, and, whle it was a little steeper and slower than the Apple 
Blossom Road, it was very drivable. There were no obstacles that would prevent anyone from 
driving either up or down this road. 
18. Mr. Rook testified during his deposition, that he never tried driving down Mellick road 
m d  that the first, md appaently the only time he obsemed Melkiick Road was i 
snow stom of 1995 or 1996 while flying to his tower because the snow was so heavy, he 
couldn't get to the tower via a roadn. Fvlr. Rook's testimony would lead one to believe that 
Mellick road was little more than a goat trait, unusable for vehicular access. His opinion appears 
to be based on little: more thm hearsayH md his one observation of the road immediately after a 
heavy snow stonn from a helicopterZ0. Since I personally drove the road sometime in 1996 or 
1997, I believe Mr. Rook's testimony about the road to be incorrect. 
19. Mr. Funk testified during his deposition that Mellick Road did extend into his propem 
in Section 1 52" He also testified that a logging road extended from Mellick Road into the 
Southeast quarter of Section 2 122. 
20. Attached and included herein as E h b i t  2, is a copy of Exhibit 2 from the Deposition of 
Harold Funk illustrating, in blue ink, the portion of the Apple BIossorn Road that Harold Funk 
used to access his property. On this map, I identified the location of the subject property in green 
to illustrate that Harold Funk's use of the road did not extend into or over the Defendant's land. 
2 1. The legal access to Signal Point road that benefits our land is the same easement that 
the Johnsons and McHughs obtained from Idaho Forest Industries and is recorded in Book 292, 
Page 353 of the Kootenai County Recorders Office as hstrument # 773361, filed July 6, 197823. 
22. This affidavit incorporates by reference the following Exhibits from the Affidavit of 
Douglas Lawrence in Support of Opposition to Summary Judgment, filed July 24,2007. The 
originals of which are attached to the affidavit. 
Exhibit A, the Viewers Report for Mellick Road filed as Instrument #756281 in Book 288, 
Page 568. 
Exhibit B, a copy of Case no: 65077, ORDER IN RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SANCTIONS. 
Exhibit 6, CASE NO. 65077, S tSRU JUDGEMENT FOR DEFENDANTS. 
Exhibit D, the Affidavit of Bruce hderson  in SuppoPt of Defendants Opposition to 
S u m q  Judgment. 
Exhibit H. copies of Kooteaai Counq Shed-iff "snlcident reports. 
Exhibit Q, Access License Agreement between Great Nodhem Broadcasting and Douglas 
sand Brenda Lawrence. 
Exhibit R, Billing Statement from Blue Sky Broadcasting. 
23. This affidavit incorporates by reference the follotving Exlxbits from the Deposition of 
Harold E d ,  August 17,2007 . The originals of which are attached to the transcript filed 10 
September 2007. 
Exhibit 1, a copy of a portion of a Metsker Map. 
Exhibit 2, B lowp  map of portion of Exlxbit 1 ; re: Blossom Mountain. 
References: 
I .  Affidavit of Bruce Anderson, 
Deposition of Harold Funk, August 13,2007, 59:3 - 59:20 
2. Deposition of Harold Funk, August 13,2007,50:5 - 50:9, 58: 1 -58:24,63:2-63: 15 
3. Deposition of Harold Funk, August 13,2007, 1 1 :25-12:3 
4. Deposition of Harold Funk, August 13,2007,25: 1 1-2523 
5. Deposition of Harold Funk, August 13,2007,66: 15-66:21, 68:25-69-7,71:9-71: 17 
6. Deposition of Harold Funk, August 13, 2007,29:2 1 -29:24, 30:25-3 1 :4 
7. Deposition of Harold Funk, August 13, 2007, 30:25-3 1 :4, 3 1 : 17 
8. Deposition of Harold Fernk, August B3,2007,29:28-29:24 
Human Syne~gistics Sales Agreement attached to the Affidavit of Susan Weeks in 
Suppor", of Motion for S 
9. Deposition of Harold Funk, August 13,2007, 29:20-29:24 
10. Easement fd&o Forest Industries g a t e d  to Don Johson and J o h  McHugh, dataled 
July 1977 and recorded as Instrument # 77336 1 and incorporated by reference as Exhibit C to the 
Afidatfit of J o h  'Whelm in Support of Defendants' Opposition to PIaintifTs Renewed Motion 
for Summary Judgment and Pm Support of Defendants' Motion for Leave to Amend Answer. 
1 1.  Easement Idaho Forest Industries granted to Don Johnson and John McWugh. dated 
July 1577 and recorded as Inst ent # 773361 and incorporated by reference as Exhibit C to the 
Afidavit of John Whelm in Support of Defendants' Opposition to Plaintifps Renewed Motion 
for S m a r y  Judgment and In Support of Defendants' Motion for Leave to Amend Answer 
12. Deposition of Harold Funk, August 13,2007, 29:21-2924 
13. Deposition of Harold Funk, August 13,2007, 68:25-6:7, 71 :9-71: 17 
14. Mead Easement attached and included in the Aflidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of 
Motion for S u m q  Judgment. 
15. Deposition of Harold Funk, August 13,2007, Exhibits 1 and 2 
16. Deposition of Harold Funk, August 13,2007, Exhbit 2 
17. Deposition of John Rook, August 20,2007, 52:2-52: 1 1 
18. Deposition of John Rook, August 20,2007, 50: 16-5 1 :5 
19. Deposition of John Rook, August 20, 2007, 72: 10-72:22 
20. Deposition of John Rook, August 20,2007, 52:2-52: 1 1 
21. Deposition of Harold Funk, August 13,2007, 59:3-59:20 
22. Deposition of Harold Funk, August 13,2807,58: I-58:24, 63 :2-63: 4.5 
23. Easement Idaho Forest Industries granted to Don Johnson and John McHugh, dated 
July 1977 and recorded as h s  ent @ 773361 and incorporated by reference as Exhibit @ to the 
Affidavit of John Whelm in Support: of Defendants' Opposition to Plaintifrs Renewed Motion 
for S u m m v  Budment and In Suppost of Defendm"r3 Notion for Leave to Amend h s w e r  
DATED this 10th day of S 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 10th day of September, 2007 
Residing at 
Comiss ion expires 
Exhibit 1 - Google Earth Satellite Imagery 
Source - Google Earth 
Numbered yellow place marks correspond to the individual 
photographs (attached) and taken by defendant in July 2007. 
Image 1 
Provides complete overview of road system and identifies the Capstar 
and Nextel sites in relationship to the roads. Yellow place marks identify 
Mellick road as it leaves Schilling Loop road (upper right) and travels 
south to intersect with Apple Blossom Road (near pin 1 3). Yellow place 
marks then follow Apple Blossom Road west to Signal Point and then 
north to East Rive~ew Road (Upper left). 
Image 2 
View is looking towards the south and depicts Melllck road as it leaves 
Schilling Loop road. Also denotes the approximute locaiion of where 
photos 1 A, 1 B, 2, and 3 were token. 
Image 3 
Position of viewer moves south. View is still looking towards the south 
and still depicts Mellick road and where photo(s) 4, 5, and 6 were 
taken. 
Image 4 
Position of viewer again moves towards the so&. View now depicts 
the private road as it leaves the public portion of Meltick road and 
travels to the Southwest quarter of Section 22. Wmin Mew is the 
Capstar parcel (upper center) and the Nextel tower (upper left). 
Image 5 
Position of the viewer moves south, right over top of the mountain and 
is looking towards the west and is overlooking the Defendants' land. At 
pin 1 3 (bottom center) is where the p&de logging road intersects 
Apple Blossom Road, just to the east of the Defendants' land. Pin 14 
identifies where the Defendants' gate is located. 
Position of viewer moves to the west and is IooWng towards the north- 
west. Road to the right of pin #15 travels to the tower bated in the 
Southwest quarter of Section 2 1 . Near pin # 1 7 is where Apple Blossom 
Road intersects with Signal Point road. 
Position of viewer has moved north-westerw and is looking towards the 
north. Just north of pin #18 is the turn around area located at the end 
of the county maintained portion of Signal Point road. A yellow iron 
gate is placed there and restricts travel to the solrth. 
Position of viewer has moved to the north and depicts Signal Point road 














JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C. 
2 1 3 N. 4" Street 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 8381 4 
Tele.: (208) 664-5891 
Fax: (208) 664-2240 
ISB# 6083 
STATE OF' ~ D A ~ o  
COUNTY OF K O O T ~ ~ ~ ~ } S ~ .  
FJLEQ: 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING 
COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA 
J. LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. CV-02-7671 
OPPOSITION OF DOUGLAS AND 
BRENDA LAWRENCE TO MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF 
PLAl NTI F F 
HEARING DATE: Sept. 24, 2007 
TIME: 3:00 p.m. 
JUDGE: JOHN T. MITCHELL 
Defendants, Douglas P. Lawrence and Brenda J. Lawrence, by and through 
their attorney of record, John P. Whelan, submit the following opposition to 
Plaintiff's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment: 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Capstar's unverifiedcomplaint alleges that i t  owns real property in 
Kootenai County. Plaintiff seeks to establish that it has a right to  cross the land 
of  Defendants under theories of easement by necessity, by implication or by 
prescriptive use.' Plaintiff has previously alleged that it had an express 
easement, but that theory was rejected on appeal. Plaintiff acquired title to i t s  
land in 2000. In November of  2002, Plaintiffs filed the instant action. 
The opposition of  Douglas and Brenda Lawrence is based on this 
memorandum, the court records and the affidavits that have been filed in this 
action in support of their oppositions to Plaintiffs motions for summary 
judgment. 
DEFENDANT'S STATEMENTS OF "UNDISPUTED FACTS" 
Many of the facts alleged by Plaintiff a being "undisputed" are not 
supported by the record in this action. Defendants submit that the following 
facts are undisputed: 
1. Since 1966, General Telephone has had a deeded right to use an 
access road that crosses the Lawrence parcel in section 21 (Ex. "W", Weeks 
Affidavit); 
Second, th i rd and fourth Causes o f  Action o f  Plaintiff's Complaint. 
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2 .  General Telephone also acquired a legal right to cross section 28 
(see Exhibit "X"-Affidavit of  Weeks); whereas Funk has never had the right to 
cross section 28; 
3 .  Section 28 was never owned by Funk, therefore there is no unity of 
title in this case; 
4. TheownerofSect ion28isnotapartytothisact ion; 
5. Funk has always had access to his lands from Mellick Road (See Aff. 
of Lawrence); 
6. Funk is not a party to this action; 
7. Plaintiff seeks to quiet title to the Lawrences land and obtain a 
judgment that it has the right to cross section 28 and the Lawrence parcel via 
the road used by CTE; 
8. In 1 975, Funk moved to Aberdeen and then to American Falls, 
Idaho, where he has resided since. (Funk Deposition, hereinafter "FD" 28:20 to 
29:24); 
9. After moving to American Falls, Funk visited his land on Blossom 
Mountain only two or three times (FD 30:25 to 31 :4); 
10. Funk has not visited the Blossom Mountain land since 1981 (FD 
31 :1 7). 
1 1 . In 1 988, Rook contacted Funk about buying land from Funk on the 
top of Blossom Mountain (FD 37:3 to 39:5; Rook Deposition, hereinafter "RD", 
10:19 to 13:12); 
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12. Funkagreedtosell thelandtoRook. Accesstothelandwasnever 
discussed. Funk never took Rook to the land. Rook first traveled to the land 
only after the purchase from Funk had closed (RD 13.1 7 to 16:20; FD, Id); 
13.  After buying the land, Rook received permission from CTE to use i ts  
road to access the land purchased (RD 58:4 to 58:15); 
14. Rook continued using the CTE access road with CTE's permission 
until he sold the subject land (RD, ID. See also 53:5 to 5411 1 ) .  
15. Mr. Rook does not remember signing an affidavit in this case (RD 
48:3 to 48:9); 
59:l 1 to 59:4 and 55:14 to 56:17); 
17. Rook could not draw a map of the Blossom Mountain land or the 
access to the land (RD 60: 1 ); 
18. Funk acknowledged that the access road was gated (FD 18:14 to 
19:4) 
1 9. Rook obtained a key from Mead, who administered the CTE road 
access (FD 27:9 to 27:l 1 ). 
20. Funk obtained a key from CTE to use the access road (FD 26:3 to 
28: 12); 
21. Mead gave Funk permission as well (FD 44:17 to 44:2 1 ) ;  
22. Funk identified the portion of the access road used (FD 51 : I  1 to 
51 :25). 
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23. Funk never talked to Ullrich about the use of Section 28; Funk did 
not own land in Section 28; and Funk did not cross section 28 for his access (FD 
54:l 1 to 54:21; 55:4 to 55:s; 59:9 to 56:23). 
24. Funk did not use the portion of the access road crossing the 
Lawrence parcel (FD 66: 1 5 to 66:2 1). 
STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Summary judgment should not be granted if  reasonable people could 
reach different conclusions or draw conflicting inference from the evidence, as 
summary judgment is proper where the evidence reveals no disputed issues of 
material fact. Farm Credit ofSpokane v. Stevenson, 1 25 ldaho 270, 869 P.2d 
1365; Rule 56(c), ldaho R. Civ. P. 
Summary judgment is  only proper if the pleadings, depositions, and 
admission on the file together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. 1.R.C.P 56(c). 
If the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, the trial court 
should grant the motion for summary judgment. Farm Credit Bank v. Stevenson, 
125 ldaho 270, 272, 896 P.2d 1365, 1367 (1 994). If the nonmoving party does 
not come forward with evidence as provided in I.R.C.P. 56(c), then summary 
judgment, i f  appropriate, shall be entered against the party." Meikle v. Torry 
Watson, 138 ldaho 680 (2003). Summary judgment is properly granted in favor 
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of the moving party when the nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of  
an element essential to  that party's case upon which that party bears the burden 
of proof at trial. Meiklcr v. Torry Watson, 138 ldaho 680 (2003). 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
ldaho Code 5 -203~  recites the following: 
No action for the recovery of real property, or for the 
recovery of  the possession thereof, can be maintained, 
unless i t  appears that the plaintiff, his ancestor, 
predecessor or grantor, was seized or possessed of the 
property in question within five (5) years before the 
commencement of the action; and this section includes 
possessory rights to lands and mining claims. 
ldaho Code 5-204~ recites the following: 
No cause of  action, or defense to an action, arising out 
o f  the title to real property, or to rents or profits out of  
the same, can be effectual unless it appears that the 
person prosecuting the action, or making the defense, 
or under whose title was seized or possessed of  the 
premises in question within twenty (20) years before 
the commencement of the act in respect to which such 
action is prosecuted or defense made. 
Plaintiff's complaint makes no reference to its predecessors interest. Yet 
Plaintiff seemingly alleges that its predecessors in interest acquired rights to use 
This statute was amended in 2006, after the instant action was filed. 
See prior footnote. 
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the Lawrence parcel and that those rights somehow inure to the benefit of 
Plaintiff. Any such rights would necessarily had to have been litigated to be 
perfected. Plaintiff has offered no evidence on the subject. 
Plaintiff's present claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitation. 
If Plaintiff's predecessors had any rights to use the Lawrence parcel, those 
claims are now stale and barred by the statute of limitations. 
LACHES 
Whether or not a party is guilty of laches is ordinarily a question of fact. 
Osterloh v, State ofldaho, 100 Idaho 702, 604 P.2d 71 6. It is beyond question 
that the Lawrences have been prejudiced by the alleged stale claims which 
Plaintiff now seeks to enforce. If Plaintiff and i t s  predecessors truly enjoyed 
easements by implication, necessity and/or by prescriptive use, those claims 
should have been perfected through litigation. The failure to pursue the claims 
by Plaintiff's predecessors has clearly prejudiced the ability of the Lawrences and 
their predecessors to defend against the claims. 
ELEMENTS OF EASEMENT BY l MPLlCATlON NOT SATlSFl ED 
OPPOSITION OF DOUGLAS AND BRENDA LAWRENCE TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF 
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Funk severed the Lawrence parcel from his remaining land in 1975 when 
* 
he entered into the Sale Agreement with Human  synergistic^.^ In 1 972, Funk 
acquired the right to  cross the Mead property in Section 21 but Funk had no 
right to cross Section 28 to  access his lands in Sections 21 and 22. 
The parcel at issue in this litigation was not created (or severed) from 
Funk's other lands until 1989 when Funk conveyed to Kootenai   road casting.' 
Clearly, then, until the 1989 conveyance to Kootenai Broadcasting, the 
land allegedly purchased by Capstar was but an undivided portion of the acreage 
held by Funk in Section 22. Funk had access to that section via Nellick Road. 
There is absolutely no evidence in the record that suggests that there was 
an existing access road to the land that would eventually become the Kootenai 
Broadcasting parcel in T975when Funk severed what would become the 
Lawrence parcel (the servient estate) from Funk's other holdings (the dominant 
estate). 
Therefore, the easement claimed by Capstar did not exist in 1975 when 
the servient estate was severed from the dominant estate. 
Furthermore, Funk never had the legal right to cross Section 28 from 
Section 21 to access his land in Section 22. Funk cannot create by implication 
See affidavit of Weeks filed September 13, 2004, pg. 2, paragraph "e" and Exhibit "EM 
thereto. 
Affidavit of Weeks filed September 13, 2004, paragraph 3e, and Exhibit "Q" thereto. 
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that which did not exist in fact in 1975. There was no access road to the land 
at issue in this action in 1975. Thus, the key element to establish an easement 
by implication is lacking in the instant action. 
The Idaho Supreme Court stated in the case of Bear Island Water Assoc., 
Id., that: 
To establish an easement by implication from prior use, 
the party seeking to establish the easement must 
demonstrate three essential elements: (1) unity of  title 
or ownership and subsequent separation by grant of  the 
dominant estate; (2) apparent continuous use long 
enough before conveyance of the dominant estate to  
show that the use was intended to be permanent; and 
(3) the easement must be reasonably necessary to  the 
proper enjoyment of  the dominant estate. Close v. 
Rensink, 95 ldaho 72, 76, 501 P.2d 1383, 1387; Davis 
v. Gowen, 83 ldaho 204, 210, 360 P.2d 403, 406-07 
(1 961). (Emphasis added). 
The third element recited above requires proof that a disputed access is 
reasonably necessary to the proper enjoyment of the dominant estate. As stated 
in the affidavits of Douglas Lawrence and Bruce Anderson, Funk has always had 
access to his Section 22 property via Nellick Road. Funk or his successors can, 
and should, provide access to Capstar. 
EASEN ENT BY NECESSITY 
An easement by necessity is founded on the following legal theory: 
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"A way of  necessity i s  an easement arising from an 
implied grant or implied reservation; i t  is of  common 
law origin and i s  supported by the rule of  sound public 
policy that lands should not be rendered unfit for 
occupancy or successful cultivation ... It is a universallv 
established principle that where a tract of  land is 
conveved which is separated from the hiahwav bv other 
lands of the qrantor or surrounded bv his lands or by 
his and those of third persons, there arises, by 
implication, in favor of the grantee, a way of necessity 
across the premises of the qrantor to the highway." 
(Emphasis added). 
Burley Brick andsand Co. v. Cofer, 102 ldaho 333, 335, 629 P.2d 1 16, 11 68 
(1 98l)(quoting 1 7A Am. Jur. Easements 5 58 (1 957)); see 25 Am. Jur. 2d 
Easements and Licenses 55 30-031 (2005). One who claims an easement by 
necessity across another's land must prove "(1 ) unity of title and subsequent 
separation of the dominant and servient estates; (2) necessity of the easement at 
the time of severance; and (3) great present necessity for the easement." Bear 
Island WaterAss'n, fnc. v. Brown, 125 ldaho 71 7, 725, 874 P.2d 528, 536 
In the matter at hand, Capstar can neither demonstrates nor alleges that 
there was a necessity for the access across the Lawrence parcel for the benefit of 
the parcelpurchased by Capstarwhen the Lawrence parcel was severed from the 
other land retained by Funk. Funk obviously had access to his other lands when 
he severed the parcel sold to Human Synergistics in 1975, otherwise Funk would 
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have taken great care to  reserve an easement across the parcel he sold to 
Human Synergistics in 1975. 
It should be noted that the parcels of land at issue sit on top of  a 
mountain. The lands are not suited for farming or residential development. The 
land is suitable only for the maintenance of  radio and phone towers. Nothing in 
the record establishes that anything but infrequent access to these sites is 
commonplace. 
EASEMENT BY PRESCRIPTION 
To establish an easement by prescription, a party must establish by clear 
and convincing evidence all of  the elements necessary for a prescriptive 
easement. Hodgins v. Sales, 139 ldaho 225, 229; Abbot v. Nampa SchoolDist. 
No. 131, 1 1  9 ldaho 544. Because i t  is no trivial thing to take another's land 
without compensation, easements by prescription are not favored by the law. 
Simmons v. Perkins, 63 ldaho 136. A prescriptive easement cannot be granted if 
the use of the servient tenement was by permission of  its owner, because such 
use, by definition, i s  not adverse to the rights of the owner. Simmons, Id. 
In the recent case Hughes v. Fisher, 124 ldaho 474, 129, P.3d 1223 
(2006), the ldaho Supreme Court created an exception to the general rule that 
the regular crossing of another's property is presumed to be adverse. Where a 
landowner constructs a way over the land for his own use and convenience, the 
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mere use thereof by others which in no way interferes with his use will be 
presumed to be by way of permission. 
The conclusionary statements offered by Capstar in support of its motion 
for summary judgment do not constitute clear and convincing evidence of 
adverse use that would benefit Capstar in the instant case. Capstar, itself, 
makes no claim of any sort that it has used the Lawrence parcel openly, 
notoriously, continuously and in a hostile manner for the statutory period. 
No prescriptive claim has been established and Capstars use of the 
Lawrence access road has alwavs been permi~s ive .~  
DATED this I! O d a y  of September, 2007. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C. A 
J hn . Whelan u 
~ t t o r n e ~  for Defendants 
See affidavits o f  Daniel Rebor and Douglas Lawrence. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ ' ' d a ~  of September, 2007, 1 caused to 
be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated 
below, and addressed to the following: 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
Attorneys at Law 
1875 N. Lakewood Drive 
Suite 200 
Coeur dl Alene, ID 8381 4 
Via: U.S. Nail, postage prepaid 
Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684 
T P e r s o n a l l y  served 
-. 
~essiva Tvrdy 
SUSAN P. W E K S  
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
1875 N. Lakewood Dr, Ste. 200 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 8 14 
Telephone: (208) 667-0685 
Facsimile: (208) 664- 1683 
ISB ff4255 
Aeorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTFUCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
Plaintiff, 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING COMPANY, 
a Delaware corporation, 
VS. 
Case No. CV 02-7671 
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. 
LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN 




In their statement of facts, Defendants claim it is relevant to this suit that Capstar 
travels across land owned by others in Section 28 to reach its destination. Defendants 
claim this fact is relevant to the present suit. This fact is irrelevant to the issue before the 
court regarding whether Plaintiff has an easement across Defendants' property. 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY MEMOQLLNDl?lvl l;N SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT: 1 4 8 4  
Defendants claim that the statute of limitations claim PlaintifP s complaint 
for two reasons. First, Defendants claim Plaintiff made no reference to predecessors in 
interest in its complaint. However, Paragraph XVII of PlaintifPs complaint alleged: 
'Capstar and its predecessors in title have used the Blossom Mountain Road as it crosses 
the Defendants' real property for access to Capstar's real property openly, notoriously, 
continuously, adversely and under claim of right for a period exceeding five (5) years." 
Defendants also claim that PIaintifPs predecessor's use of the road does 
not inure to Plaintiffs benefit. This claim is contrary to Idaho law. Idaho recognizes 
tacking to achieve the prescriptive period of use on an easement appurtenant. In Hodgins 
v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225, 76 P.3d 969 (2003) the Supreme Court clearly noted: 
The prescriptive period in Idaho is five years. I.C. tj 5-203. 
Therefore, each Property Owner must prove that he or his predecessors used 
the roadway across the Sales' property for some uninterrupted five-year 
period of time before the suit was filed. See State ex rel. Harnatz v. Fox, 100 
Idaho 140, 146, 594 P.2d 1093, 1099 (1979) (holding I.C. tj 5-208 "in effect 
gives an owner five years to take the necessary and appropriate legal action 
to have an unauthorized use of property stopped"). Tacking is the concept 
that allows the current owner to combine his or her prescriptive use with 
that of a previous owner, in order to meet the five-year statutory 
requirement. Thus, a claimant who has not owned the subject property for 
the statutory period "may rely on the adverse use by the claimant's 
predecessor for the prescriptive period, or the claimant may combiile such 
predecessor's use with the claimant's own use to establish the requisite five 
continuous years of adverse use." Marshall v. Blair, 130 Idaho at 680, 946 
P.2d at 980 (citations omitted). 
Thus it is entirely appropriate for Plaintiff to incorporate its predecessors' use of 
the road into its claim. 
LACHES 
Lawrences claim that the doctrine of laches prohibits this lawsuit. Defendants 
claim "it is beyond question" that Lawrences have been prejudiced by the alleged stale 
claims Plaintiff seeks to enforce. However, prior to Lawrences locking the gate and 
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prohibiting travel on their propert.y, Plaintiff and its predecessors right to cross the 
properly was not challenged. Thus, the adverse possession claim is not stale. 
DISPUTED FACTS 
Originally in this motion it was argued that the implied reservation and 
prescriptive use claimed in this case was established across the Lawrence parcel from the 
time Funk sold the Lawrence parcel to Human Syngergistics in July 1975. 
At his deposition, Mr. Funk was provided the Metsker map to "refkesh his 
memory'" regarding the roads in the area. The Metsker map is inaccurate because it 
shows Blossom Mountain in Section 21, when in fact what is cornmonly k n o w  as the 
top of Blossom Mountain lies in Section 22 (where the tower sites are located.) Mr. Funk 
was confused by this reference point (Funk- Dep Tr p. 10,ll. 10-25). Mr. Funk testified 
that he was up to the property in the six year period between when he bought the property 
until he sold the Lawrence parcel 20 to 30 times and that he used the GTE road each 
time. (Funk Dep Tr pp. 11-25; p. 26'11. 1-4.) Mr. Funk noted during his deposition that 
the Metsker map showed the road different than he recalled (Funk Dep Tr p. 45'11. 11- 
18.) Mr. Funk testified that Bell telephone had its site at Blossom Mountain. (Funk Dep 
Tr p. 48'11. 17-19.) Mr. Funk then agreed when defendants' counsel marked his access 
as going from the road to the top of Blossom Mountain as shown on the Metsker map in a 
different route than the GTE easeement. (Funk- Dep Tr p. 49'11. 2-15). Nonetheless, Mr. 
Funk continued to indicate that the road marked on the Metsker map and the road he 
followed was the GTE access road. (Funk Dep Tr p. 53,lI. 7-24.) W e n  shown a map 
with Blossom Mountain and the tower sites properly located in Section 22, Mr. Funk 
testified that the road depicted on that exhibit was the route he followed, which ended at 
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the telephone tower. (Funk Dep Tr p. 64,lI. 7-25, p. 65,11. 1-25; p. 66,ll. 1-4.) Mr. Funk 
indicated the road was built by the telephone company. (Funk Dep Tr p. 68, 11. 12-18.) 
Mr. Funk placed the access road and the gate on the access road in different locations 
depending on which map he was looking at based on where it showed Blossorn 
Mountain. (See Exhibits 2 and 6, Funk deposition.) 
Thus, Funk's own deposition testimony is unclear. However, 
"Wben an action will be tried before the court without a 
jury, the trial court as the trier of fact is entitled to arrive at the most 
probable inferences based upon the undisputed evidence properly before it 
and grant the summary judgment despite the possibility of conflicting 
inferences. Shawer  v. Huckleberry Estates, L.L.C., 140 Idaho 354, 360- 
61,93 P.3d 685,691-92 (2004). "The test for reviewing the inferences 
drawn by the trial court is whether the record reasonably supports the 
inferences." Id. 
J. R. Silnplot Co. v. Bosen, - Idaho , P.3d - (S.Ct. Opinion 3 1706, 
2006). 
The GTE access road was surveyed by GTE, a copy of which survey was 
provided by Mr. Lawrence in a previous deposition in another matter (Exhibit "Y" to 
Weeks Affidavit filed March 9,2004). This surveyed road is consistent with Exhibit 6 of 
Mr. Funk's deposition. Even though Mr. Funk's two maps at deposition are not 
consistent, his testimony that he was using the GTE road is consistent throughout the 
deposition. Thus, the reasonable inference to be drawn from his repeated testimony that 
he used the GTE road is that as depicted in Exibit "Y", which is consistent with Exhibit 6 
of Mr. Funk's deposition. 
EASEMENT BY PRESCRIPTION 
The standards for establishment of a prescriptive easement were reiterated in 
Akers, supra at 206 as follows: 
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A party seeking to establish the existence of an easement by prescription 
"must prove by clear and convincing evidence use of the subject property, 
wllich is characterized as: (I I open and notorious; (2) continuous and 
unintempted; (3) adverse and under a claim of right; (4) with the actual or 
imputed knowledge of the owner of the sen~ient tenement (5) for the 
statutory period." Hodgins, 139 Idaho at 229,76 P.3d at 973. The statutory 
period in question is five years. I.C. 5 5-203; Weaver, 134 Idaho at 698, 8 
P.3d at 1241. A claimant may rely on his own use, or he "may rely on the 
adverse use by the claimant's predecessor for the prescriptive period, or 
the claimant may combine such predecessor's use with the claimant's own 
use to establish the requisite five continuous years of adverse use." 
h d g i n s ,  139 Idaho at 230, 76 P.3d at 974. Once the clairnant presents 
proof of open, notorious. continuous. uninterrupted use of the claimed 
right for the prescriptive period, even without evidence of how the use 
began, he raises the presumption that the use was adverse and under a 
claim of right. Wood v. I-laglund, 1 3 1 Idaho 700, 702-03, 963 P.2d 383, 
385-86 (1998): hrlarshaZ2 v. Blair, 130 Idaho 675, 680,946 P.2d 975, 980 
(1997). The burden then shifis to the owner of the servient tenement to 
show that the claimant's use was permissive, or by virtue of a license, 
contract, or agreement. Wood, 13 1 Idaho at 703,963 P.2d at 386; 
Mar*shal'l, 130 Idaho at 680,946 P.2d at 980. The nature of the use is 
adverse if "it runs contrary to the servient owner's claims to the property." 
Hodgins, 139 Idaho at 23 l , 7 6  P.3d at 975. The state of mind of the users 
of the alleged easement is not controlling; the focus is on the nature of 
their use. Id. at 23 1-32, 76 P.3d at 975-76. 
From the point Mr. Funk sold the Lawrence parcel, he did not use the road very 
often because he moved from the area. In 1989, Mr. Funk sold another portion of his 
property. Kootenai Broadcasting purchased this property which was located on the very 
top of Blossom Mountain (Rook Dep Tr p. 8,ll. 19-25.) 
Mr. Rook testified there was only one road to the top of Blossom Mountain (Rook 
Dep Tr p. 15,ll. 18-23.) The road he used was being used by GTE (Dep Tr p. 17,lI. 14- 
21). Mr. Rook testified consistent with his affidavit that the road he used for access was 
the one used was an existing access road from Signal Point road and that it terminated in 
the area of the General Telephone site. (Rook Dep Tr p. 52,ll. 12-25; p. 53,ll. 1-8.) .) 
Mr. Rook testified that his parcel had access by one road and Exhibit "C" of his affidavit 
was illustrative of the road as he recalled it. (Rook Dep Tr p. 70,ll. 13-25.) 
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Mr. Rook" sconipanies owled the site and used the road for ten years (Rook Dep 
Tr p. 15- 16) Mr. Rook indicated that his contract engineer would be at the parcel of 
propefiy every two to three weeks to do maintenance, and sometimes every week. (Rook 
Dep Tr p. 32,ll. 4-10; p. 38,ll. 23-25; p. 39,11. 1-2.) Mr. Rook also visited the site four 
times a year. (Rook Dep Tr p. 40,ll. 19-21). A tower was built on the site in 1991 or 
1992. (Rook Dep Tr p. 35,11, 7-19.) Rook allowed Trinity Broadcasting to locate a dish 
next to his tower. (Rook Dep Tr p. 65.11.4-8.) Mr. Rook also leased space. (Rook Dep 
Tr p. 63,ll. 19-24 
Lawences cite to Hughes v. Fisher, 124 Idaho 474, 129 P.3d 1223 (2006) for the 
proposition that there is no prescriptive use in the present case. In Hughes v. Fisher, the 
trial court reiterated the general rule that the regular crossing of another's property is 
presumed to be adverse with the exception that where a landowner constructs a way over 
the land for his own use and convenience, the mere use of it by others that doesn't 
interfere with his use will be presumed permissive. In this case, there is no evidence that 
Lawrence or his predecessor constructed the road. In the present case, there is evidence 
that the road existed in 1966 when GTE obtained its easement across the road. It 
certainly existed when Funk started using it, and it existed when Rook started using it. 
There is no evidence it was constructed by Funk, Lawrence or any of their joint 
predecessors in title. Thus, there is no basis to presume that the use by Funks and others 
has been permissive. 
The record supports a finding that Kootenai Broadcasting used this easement, 
considered it had a right to use it, and did not abandon the easement. Therefore, Capstar 
is entitled to this prescriptive easement as a successor in interest. 
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In a convoluted argument, Lawrences argue that the record does not suppod a 
finding that the road across Lawrences' parcel was intended to serve as access to the 
Capstar parcel at the time of the severance because the Capstar parcel had not yet been 
created. Lawrences are confused. At the time that Funks transferred the Section 21 
parcel in 1975, they retained their parcel in the Southwest Quarter of Section 22. Thus, if 
an implied easement arose, it arose at the time of severance of the servient estate in favor 
of Funks' retained parcel in the Southwest Quarter of Section 22 as the domillant estate. 
The implied easement is analyzed at the time of the severance of Lawrences' parcel from 
Funks' original holdings, not at the later date when Funks sold a portion of the dominant 
estate to Kootenai Broadcasting as argued by Lawrences. If an implied easement was 
created in 1975 for the benefit of Funks' retained Section 22 parcel, it passes by operation 
of law when Funks transfer any portion of the retained Section 22 parcel. See I.C. 5 55- 
603 (easements pass with property). 
Lawrences also claim that in 1975 that Funks had access to their retained Section 
22 property through their property from Mellick Road. In support of this contention, 
Lawrences provide the affidavit of Bruce Anderson, Kootenai County Surveyor, and the 
Viewer's Report for Mellick Road and a Metsker map from 1959 which they contend 
supports their position.' Lawrences cite to the three elements of an easement implied 
from prior use and contend that Capstar has failed in its requirement on the third element 
that the easement must be reasonably necessary to the property enjoyment of the 
1 Lawrences contend that Metsker maps are generally reliable and therefore they should not have to lay a 
foundation for the accuracy of the map. Although Capstar disagrees with this contention, it will address 
that matter in a separate motion to strike. 
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dominant estate based upon these documents. These documents do not support 
Lawrences' argument. 
Funks acquired their properly frorn Radens and Marcoes. (Weeks Affidavit filed 
3/9/2004, Exhibits ""B" and "C".) At the time of purchase, Funks acquired Government 
Lot 3 of Section 15; the Southeast Quarter of Section 21; Government Lot 4, the 
Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter (SW NW %) and the Southwest Quarter 
(SW %) of Section 22. Bruce Anderson's testified in his affidavit2 that based upon his 
review of the Viewer's Report and Judge Haman's opinion in Loudin v. Stokes that Funks 
could access their Section 15 property frorn Mellick Road. M i l e  this statement is true, it 
leaves unaddressed the issue of whether Funk's could proceed on Mellick Road beyond 
the Section 15 property to access their Section 22 property as Lawrences claim. 
The following is an illustrative depiction of the properties in question utilizing a 
Kootenai County road map. The properties Funks originally acquired are highlighted in 
yellow. The red x's on the illustration are the approximate location of Mellick Road 
(along the creek) as laid out by the Viewer's Report for Mellick Road. 
2 This affidavit was not separately filed with the court. Rather, it is contained as Exhibit "D" to the 
Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence. 
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As can be seen from the Viewer's Report, the public road ended in the Northeast 
Quarter (NE !4 ) of Section 21. Funk never owned property in the Northeast Quarter of 
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Section 2 1. Thus, Mellick Road as laid out by the county surveyor did not access Section 
Referencing the Metsker map relied upon by Lawrence, it depicts the road 
extending beyond the terminus of the public road as established in the Viewer's report, 
through the remaining portion of the Northeast Quader of Section 2 1 and turning east 
back into Section 22. Again, Funks never owned the Northeast Quarter of Section 21. 
There is absolutely no evidence that Funks successors used Mellick Road as extended to 
access the Section 22 property. Thus, the record is devoid of any evidence that Funk 
would have had a right to continue beyond the public road to access the property he 
acquired in Section 22. 
Further, the inference that Lawrences wish this court to draw fiom the 1958 
Metsker map is that the road shown in the general vicinity of Mellick Road existed in 
1975 and provided access to the Section 22 property. Lawrences contend this court 
should take judicial notice of the Metsker map because of Lawrences' view that Metsker 
maps have been relied on for many decades and are readily verifiable. However, Metsker 
maps have also been know11 to be wrong. As a general rule, maps, plats and diagrams 
must be properly authenticated and shown to be accurate before they can be admitted as 
evidence. 29A Am.Jur. Evidence 5 990. This map has not been properly authenticated, 
or shown to be accurate for the relevant time period. If the evidence on the map is as 
readily verifiable as Lawrences contend in their request for judicial notice, they should 
have verified it with admissible evidence submitted in conjunction with the map. 
Otherwise, the document is hearsay. It does not contradict Funk's testimony that in 1975 
when he acquired the property, there was no access to Section 22 from Mellick Road. 
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Although not completely articulated in Lawences' memorandum, it is anticipated 
they will argue that because he owned property in Section 15 which touched on the 
public right-of-way that that he could have developed a road across his Section 15 
holding into Section 22, which is contiguous to Section 15 and lies directly south of 
Section 15. In Akevs v. D.L. Wbzite Gonst., Inc. 142 Idaho 293, 302, 127 P.3d 196,205 
(2005), our Supreme Court held that: 
With respect to an implied easement from prior use, under Idaho law 
"reasonable necessity is something less than the great present necessity 
required for an easement implied by necessity." Davis, 133 Idaho at 643, 
991 P.2d at 368. W e n  determining whether such "reasonable necessity" 
existed, a court does not look to the present moment, but instead 
determines whether reasonable necessity existed at the time the dominant 
and servient estates were severed. Id. at 642, 991 P.2d at 367. Once an 
implied easement by prior use is found to have existed at the time of 
severance, it "is not later extinguished if the easement is no longer 
reasonably necessary." Id. at 643,991 P.2d at 368. "[Aln implied 
easement by prior use is appurtenant to the land and therefore passes with 
all subsequent conveyances of the dominant and servient estates." Id. 
In Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637,991 P.2d 362 (1999) our Supreme Court 
addressed the showing necessary to establish the third element of an implied easement. 
The court therein was presented with the argument that since there was an undeveloped 
public right of way that could be developed to provide access to the dominant estate that 
an implied easement did not arise at the date of severance. The court rejected this 
argument, noting that an undeveloped access is not a usable access. The same is true 
here. Funks' uncontroverted testimony is that as of the date of his purchase of his 
property, Mellick Road did not provide access to his Section 22 property. Merely 
because there was a public right of way that could have been developed and extended 
through a portion of Funks' property, Funk was not required to develop and extend it. 
Lawrences' contention that as of 1996 when he acquired the property that Mellick 
Road had been developed to a point to allow use of it to access the property in question 
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does not assist the court in its inquiry of the access in 1975, which is the relevant time 
period.3 
An implied easement does not end, even when reasonable necessity no longer 
exists, Davis at 367. In the present case, the uncontroverled testimony of Harold Funk is 
that the road in dispute was the only usable access to his repained Section 22 property in 
1975. This statement is supported by the affidavit of Kelvin Brownsberger, Post Falls 
Highway District road supervisor, indicating that Mellick Road is only partially 
developed and maintained by the highway district (which portion based upon his exhibit 
appears to be generally located in the Northwest Quarter of Section 15.) 
Capstar has presented uncontroverted evidence that at the time of severance the 
access was reasonably necessary. As Funks' successor in title, Capstar is entitled to the 
benefit of the implied easement. 
Lawrences also invites this court to examine the quality of Capstar's right to pass 
over a portion of the access road lying in Section 28 in determining reasonable necessity. 
Lawsences argue Funks can't establish a claim over Section 28 by implication. The 
portion of the access road lying in Section 28 is unrelated to this suit as it was not owned 
by Funks and Capstar is not anempting to establish an easement by necessity against a 
stranger to title. 
EASEMENT BY NECESSITY 
Lawrences claim that there is no present necessity for use of the road because 
Mellick Road as improved by John Mack, one of Funks' predecessors, now allows access 
to the site. Lawrences contend there is no ilecessity because Capstar, as Funks' successor 
in interest, has a right to use Mellick Road as now developed. Apparently, the argument 
3 Further, there is admissible evidence in the record that this contention is not true. 
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is that Capstar would have an implied easement across the road, eve11 though Funks never 
used the road at the time of segregation. 
On March 24,2004, John Mack prepared an affidavit in this matter on behalf of 
Lau~ences. Mr. Mack indicated that in 1992 he purchased property in Section 22 from 
Funks, and was the last remaining property owned by Funks. Mr. Mack indicated that at 
the time he purchased, he inquired about access and the realtor told him he h e w  the way. 
Mr. Mack then relayed that in the spring of 1994, he was stopped by Idaho Forest 
Indsutries nad informed he did not have legal access across Section 28, and it was 
demanded he stop traversing that section. Mr. Mack testified his Section 22 property was 
landlocked. Mr. Mack indicated that as late as 1996, he was aneinpting to obtain 
easements to access the Funk property. Mr. Mack testified that in 2002, he purchased 
property from Fred Zuber in the East half of the Northwest % of Section 22 (property 
never owned by Funks) to obtain access to the Funk parcel. Thus, Mr. Mack's affidavit 
makes dear  that Mellick Road did not provide access to the Funks parcels in 1996 as 
claimed by Mr. Lawrence. 
Consistent with Mr, Mack-s affidavit, it is apparent that Mellick Road as 
developed today does not pass over Funks' property. As demonstrated on the assessor's 
map included as Exhibit "A" to Weeks' Affidavit in Support of Motion to Strike 
Lawrence Affidavit filed 7/24/07, Mellick Road as constructed today lies in the Northeast 
Quarter and the Southeast Quarter of Section 22. Funks never owned either of these 
parcels, and therefore, Capstar has no implied easement to travel the road across these 
parcels of property. Funk, Kootenai Broadcasting and Capstar have not used Mellick 
Road to access their properties. Thus, there would be no prescriptive easement right 
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Capstar could assert. Capstar is not an entity entitled to condemn an easement under 
Idaho Code Title 7 for a public ptlrpose. Thus, Capstar has no right to use Mellick Road 
as constructed today. Without use of the cunent access road, Gapstar's parcel would be 
landlocked. Therefore, it is currently necessary for Capstas to retain the historic access 
road used by its predecessors. 
CONCLUSION 
Lawrences have failed to show that there is not an implied easement, a 
prescriptive easement or an easement by necessity in favor of Capstar. Thus, the court 
should grant Capstar's motion for summary judgment. 
DATED this 1 7t" day of September, 2007. 
JAMES, VERNON & W E K S ,  P.A. 
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JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
1875 N. Lakewood Dr, Ste. 200 
Cocur d'Alene, ID 838 14 
Telephone: (208) 667-0683 
ISB #4255 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
Plaintiff, 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING COMPANY, 
a Delaware corporation, 
VS. 
Case No. CV 02-767 1 
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. 
LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS 
OF AFFIDAVIT OF DOUG 
LAWRENCE FILED SEPTEMBER 
10,2007 
Defendants. i 
COMES NOW Plaintiff and pursuant to Rule 56 (e), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, 
hereby moves to strike portions of the affidavit of Douglas Lawrence for the reasons enumerated 
herein. 
Regarding affidavits submitted in support of summary judgment, Posey v. Ford Motor 
Credit Co., 11 1 P.3d 162 (Idaho Ct.App. 2005) discussed the requirement that evidence 
submitted by affidavit must be admissible to be considered by the court. Therein the court noted: 
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Posey argues that nearly the entire affidavit is inadmissible because it does not 
show that the malters averred to are based on personal howledge, contains 
conclusory assertions, contains illadmissible hearsay and provides no foundation 
for inboduction of attached exhibits. Posey's position is well taken. 
Affidavits supporting or opposing a summary judgment motion must be made on 
personal knowledge, must set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, 
and must show affirnlatively that the affiant is competent to testifL to the matters 
stated. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e). These requirements "are not satisfied 
by an affidavit that is conclusory, based on hearsay, and not supported by 
personal knowledge. " (Cites omitted.) 
The Posey v. Ford Motor Credit Co. court iirrther noted: 
Eight documents are attached to the affidavit. No foundation is provided 
concerning who prepared the documents, several of which, on their face, indicate 
that they were not prepared by Ford but by the Galdwell dealership. The affidavit 
purports to identify the documents without demonstration of the requisite personal 
knowledge for authentication of the documents pursuant to I.R.E. 901 and 
includes arguments as to the documents' legal e f i c t ,  none of which is admissible. 
(Cite omitted.) To the extent that the documents are offered to show the truth of 
assertions contained within them, the documents are hearsay for which no hearsay 
rule exception has been established by the Griffith affidavit. In State v. Hill, 140 
Idaho 625, 97 P.3d 1014 (Ct.App. 2004). we described the foundational 
requirements for application of I.R.E. 803(6), the exception to the hearsay rule for 
business records: 
Rule 803(6), the business record exception to the hearsay 
rule, allows admission of a record or report if it was made 
and kept in the course of a regularly conducted business 
activity and if it was the regular practice of that business to 
make the report or record. See Henderson v. Sinith, 128 
Idaho 444,450, 915 P.2d 6, 12 (1996); In the Interest of 
S. K,  127 Idaho 5 13, 520, 903 P.2d 102, 109 (Ct.App. 
1995). These foundational requireinents must be shown 
through "the testimony of the custodian or other qualified 
witness." I.R.E. 803(6). That is, the record must be 
authenticated by someone "who has custody of the record 
as a regular part of his or her work or who has supervision 
of its creation." Henderson, 128 Idaho at 450, 91 5 P.2d at 
12. A document is not admissible under I.R.E. 803(6) 
unless the person testifying has a personal knowledge of 
the record-keeping system used by the business which 
created the document. Id.; Herrick v. Leuzinger, 127 Idaho 
293,297, 900 P.2d 20 1,205 (Ct.App. 1995). 
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Hill, 140 Idaho at 628, 9'7 P.3d at 10 17. The mere receipt and 
retention by a business entity of a document that was created 
elsewhere does not transfom the document into a business record 
of the receiving entity for purpases of I.R.E. 803(6). Id.; In 
[he Interest qfS. U:, 137 Idaho 5 13, 520,903 P.2d 102, 1 09 
(Ct.App. 1995). Griffith's affidavit does not comply with the 
requirements of Rule 803(6) with respect to any of the records 
attached to his affidavit. 
The following portions of Mr. Lawrence's affidavit should be stricken: 
1. Paragraph 4 is a legal conclusion with argument referenced to other individuals' 
affidavits and depositions. 
2. Paragraph 5 is argument, and not based on defendant's personal knowledge. 
3. Paragraph 6 is argument and not based on defendant's personal knowledge. 
4. Paragraph 7 is argument based upon the deposition of Harold Fuilk, not 
defendant's personal knowledge. 
5 .  Paragraph 8 is argument from the deposition of Harold Funk, not defendant's 
personal knoweldge. 
6. Paragraph 9 is argument from the deposition of Harold Funk, not defendant's 
personal knowledge. 
7. Paragraph 10 is argument, and not based upon defendant's personal knowledge. 
8. Paragraph 1 1 is argument, and not based upon defendant's personal knowledge. 
9. Paragraph 12 is argument, and not based upon defendant's personal knowledge. 
10. Paragraph 13 is argument, and not based upon defendant's personal knowledge. 
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1 1. Paragraph 14 is argument, and not based upon defendant's personal knowledge. 
12. Paragraph 1 5 is argument. 
13. Paragraph 16, sentences 2 , 3 , 5  and 7 are argument, and not based upon personal 
knowledge. Further, there is no foundation for the summary contained on Exhibit 1 regarding 
intersections. 
14. Paragraph 18 is argument, and not based upon defendant's personal knowledge. 
15. Paragraph 19 is argument, and not based upon defendant's personal knowledge. 
16. Paragraph 20 is argument, and not based upon defendant's personal knowledge. 
17. Paragraph 2 1 is argument, and not based upon defendant's personal knowledge. 
DATED this 17"' day of September, 2007 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
BY: 
SUSAN P. WEEKS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF AFFIDAVIT OF DOUG LAWRENCE FILED 
503 
SEPTEMBER 10,2007: 4 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the I 7 fl. day of , I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
U.S. Mail El Overnight Mail 
CSY" Hand Delivered C7 Telecopy (FAX) 
John P. Whelan 
2 13 4th Street 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83 8 16 
Facsimile: (208) 664-2240 
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SUSAN P. WEEKS 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
1875 N. Lakewood Dr, Ste. 200 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 8 14 
Telephone: (208) 667-0685 
Facsimile: (208) 664- 1683 
ISB if4255 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
GAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING COMPANY, 
a Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. 
L A W N C E ,  husband and wife, 
Case No. CV 02-7671 
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS 
OF AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS 
LAWRENCE FILED JULY 24, 
2007 
Defendants. I 
Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence came 
before the Court for hearing on August 7,2007. The court heard argument of counsel, 
reviewed the affidavits, and made its findings of record at the hearing, Plaintiff's Motion 
to Strike is granted in part and denied in part. 
1 .  The last sentence of paragraph 3 of Mr. Lawrence's affidavit is stricken. 
The objection is overruled with respect to the remainder of paragraph 3. 
2. Paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 are stricken. 
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3. Paragraph 8 is sustained on foundation grounds, but overruled as to the 
identification of Exhibit E, Metsker's slap. 
4. The motion to strike the first sentence of Paragraph 9 is overruled and 
granted on the second sentence and the third sentence. The Exhibit remains as evidence. 
5. The motion to strike Paragraph 10 is denied. 
6. The motion is granted with respect to the second sentence of Paragraph 
7. The motion is denied with respect to Paragraph 14. 
8. The motion is denied with respect to Paragraph 15. 
9. The motion is denied with respect to Paragraph 17. 
10. The motion is granted with respect to the third, fourth and fifth sentences 
only of Paragraph1 8. 
1 1. The motion is granted with respect to the second and third sentences of 
Paragraph 1 9. 
12. The motion is granted as to the second sentence of Paragraphs 20. 
13. The motion is denied with respect to Paragraph 22. 
14. Paragraph 23 is stricken. 
1 5 .  Paragraph 24 is stricken. 
16. The motion is denied with respect to Paragraph 40. 
17. The motion is granted as to the second, fourth and fifth sentences of 
Paragraph 44. 
18. Paragraph 47 is stricken. 
19. The motion is granted as to the last sentence of Paragraph 48. 
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20. Paragraph 49 is stricken, 
2 1. Paragraph 5 1 is stricken. 
22. Paragraph 52 is stricken. 
23. Paragraph 54 is stricken. 
24. The rnotion is granted to all sentences except the first sentence of 
Paragraph 57, 
25. The rnotion is granted to all sentences except the first sentence of 
Paragraph 58. 
26. The fifth, seventh, eight and tenth sentence are stricken of Paragraph 59. 
27. The objection is ovemled as to Paragraph 60. 
28. Paragraph 6 1 is stricken. 
29. Paragraph 67 is stricken. 
30. Paragraph 68 is striken. 
33. Paragraph 69 is stricken. 
DATED this E % a y  of September, 2007. 
D' trict J dge "\/ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the \$? day of September, 2007,1 caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to the following: 
U.S. Mail Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 'Telecopy (FAX) 
Susan P. Weeks 
1875 N. Lakewood Drive, Ste. 200 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83 8 14 
Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684 J 
John P. Whelan 
2 13 4" Street 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 838 16 
Facsimile: (208) 664-2240 
ORDER ON MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF AFFIDAVIT 
OF DOUGLAS L A W E N C E  FILED JULY 24,2007: 4 
SUSAN P. WEEKS 
JAMES, VERNON r4;: WEEKS, P.A. 
1875 N. Lakewood Dr, Ste. 200 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83 8 14 
Telephone: (208) 667-0685 
Facsimile: (208) 664- 1683 
ISB fit4255 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST SUDIGIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
Plaintiff, 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING COMPANY, 
a Delaware corporation, 
VS. 
Case No. CV 02-767 1 
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. 
L A m N C E ,  husband and wife, 
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO STRIKE 
DEFENDANTS' PLEADINGS OR 
IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR 
ENLARGEMENT OF TIME 
Defendants. 1 
Plaintiffs moved to strike: (1) Defendants' Motion to Strike portions of certain 
affidavit filed by Plaintiff in support of its summary judgment, (2) Defendants' 
opposition response to Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and supporting 
affidavits, (3) Defendants' Motion for Enlargement of Time, and (4) Request for Judicial 
Notice because they were not timely. In the alternative, Plaintiffs moved for an 
enlargement of time to respond to the above pleadings. The Court having heard 
argument of counsel on August 7,2007, and enunciated its findings of record, 
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANTS' PLEADINGS OR 
IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME: 1 
508 
NOW T H E E F O m ,  the Court grants the motion for enlargement of time to 
respond and denies the motion to strike as being moot. 
4"- DATED this [T day of September, 2007. 
(TOEIN p. MITCHELL 
istric Judge u 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the I % day of September, 2007,I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to the following: 
U.S. Mail Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered Telecopy (FAX) 
Susan P. Weeks 
1875 N. Lakewood Drive, Ste. 200 
Coeur d'AIene, ID 83814 
Facsimile: (208) 664- 1684 J 
John P. Whelan 
2 13 4& Street 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
Facsimile: (208) 664-2240 
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANTS' PLEADINGS OR 509 
IN THE KTERNATIVE FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME: 2 
SUSAN I?. WEEKS 
J M S ,  VEWON & WEKS,  P.A. 
1875 N. Mewood Br, Ste. 200 
Coem d'AIene, 1D 838 7 4 
Telephone: (208) 667-0655 
Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684 
TSB a 2 5 5  
2081 SEP 2 1 PH 2: 4 4 
Attorneys far P l a h ~ f l  
TN THE DISmTCT COURT OF 'IFE FlRST JtrDICTAL DISTRTCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR T E  CQmR OF KOOTENAI 
CMSTAR R4DIO OPERATWG COWANY, 
a Delaware corporation, 
VS. 
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. 
LAWENCE, busband sul& wife, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 02-7671 
MORON TO SHORTEN TIME 
CONES NOW the above named Plaintiff, and moves the Court for an order shortening 
the notice of time to hear Plaintiff's Motion to Correct Judgment. This  motion is made on the 
fact that Plaintiff made a calendaring crror and did not file the motion on September 1 7,2007 
DATED this 2lS day of September, 2007. 
JAmS,  VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
BY W M - U  &, 
SUSAN P. WEEKS 
MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME: 1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERmCE 
I hereby certiiy that on the 2 1 day of September, 2007, I caused to be sen-ed a true and 
comct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below. and addressed to the 
following: 
U.S. Mail Overnight Mail 
Wand Delivered Telecopy (FAX) 
Jolin P. %%elan 
213 4@' Street 
Coeur d' Alene, iJC) 83 8 16 
Facsimile: (205) 664-2240 
MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME: 2 
SUSGV P. W E K S  
JAMES, VEWON & m E K S ,  P.A. 
1875 N. Lakewood Dr, Ste. 200 
Coeur d'Atene, LD 83 8 1 4 
Telephone: (205) 667-0683 
ISB M 2 5 5  
Attorneys for Plaintip 
N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FlRST JTjDICTAL DISTRICT OF TFE 
STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAT 
CAPST,.liR RADIO OPERATING COMPANY. ' 
a Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Case No. CV 02-767 1 
MOTION TO CORRECT 
JUDGMENT 
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. 
LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
COMES SOW Plaintiff and pursuant to Rule 60(a), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, 
moves the Court to enter the judgment eotered September 11. 2007 regarding judicial notice of 
the Metsker nap. The Court did not rule that the Metsker map was accurate. Tt ruled that it 
would take notice that it was a Metsker map. 
0. DATED this 2 day of September. 2007. 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
BY: 3 M.& 
SUSAN P. WEEKS 
Attorneys for PIaintiff 
MOTION TO C0RIZ;ECT JUDGMENT: 1 
I b a b y  certify %at on the y of September, 1 caused to be senred a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing doctrment by the method indicated below, and addressed to tile 
following: 
U.S. Mail Ovenniat Mail 
Hand DeJivered Telecopy (FAX) 
John P. Whe1a:n 
2 13 4th Street 
Coe~u d'Alene, ID 8381 6 
Facsimile: (208) 664-2240 
MOTION TO CORRECT JUDGMENT: 2 
0 9 / 2 5 1 2 0 0 7  1 4  2 7  FAX 6642240  John P Whelan, P C 
jOt-fN P, WHEMN, P.C. 
21 3 N. 4th Street 
Goeur d3Alene, ID 8381 4 
Tele.: (208) 664-5891 
Fax; (208) 664-2240 
lSB# 6083 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNlY OF KOOTENAI 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING 
COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA 
J. LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR LEAVE 
TO AMEND ANSWER 
Defendants, I 
CASE NO. CV-02-7671 
Defendants', Douglas P. Lawrence and Brenda J. Lawrence, Motion for 
Leave to Amend Answer came regularly before the Coun on September 24, 
2007. John P. Whelan appeared for Defendants. Susan P. Weeks appeared for 
Plaintiff. 
Having heard the argument of counsel and having reviewed the evidence, 
the Court hereby grants the request of Douglas Lawrence and Brenda Lawrence 
for leave to file an amended answer raising the additional defense of laches. 
The Lawrences shall not be required to physically file an amended answer as this 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND ANSWER - 1 
v u j  L J ~ C ~ U I  I *  L I  r n n  o o r ~ ~ q u  
order shall serve to authorize the amendment of the Lawrences' answer to raise 
the defense of laches. 
Dated: AdI v 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND ANSWER - 2 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of ,2007,l  
caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method 
indicated below, and addressed as indicated below; 
John P, Whelan 
213 N. 4" Street 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83814 
Via: U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Fax to (208) 664-2240 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
Attorneys at Law 
1 875 N. Lakewood Drive 
Suite 200 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4 
Via: U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684 
CLERK OF T H E  DISTRICT COURT 
I\ 
By: 
SUSAX P. W E K S  
JPLNES, E R N O N  62 W E K S ,  P.A. 
1 875 N, Mewood Dr, Stc. 200 
Coeur d'Aiene, ID 83 8 14 
Telephone: (208) 667-0683 
F a c ~ ~ l c :  (208) 664-1 684 
TSB #4255 
JVW PAGE 10133 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DTSTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST +JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF Tm 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR 'THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING COMPANY, 
a Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. 
LAWEKCE, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 02-767 1 
ORDER ALLOWRcTG FOR 
SHORTENED T m  XN WHICH 
TO m A R  APPLICATTON 
Based on Plaintiffs' Moti.on. to Shorten Time, good cause appearing for the same, 
IT IS H E E B Y  ORDERED that Plaintiffs Application for Sixth Access shall be heard 
on October 29- 2007, at the hour of 4 p.m. at the Kootenai County Courthouse. Coeur d'Alene, 
Idalio. 
DATED this 3 [" day of October, 2007 
JOEN T. MITCHELL 
PAGE 11/13 
CERTIFICATE OF SERWCE 
I hmby certify that on the 31 day of 200'7, I caused to be servcd a 
true and correa copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed 





Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vman  62 Weeks, P.A. 
T 875 N. Lakewood Dr., Suite 200 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 838 14 
Facsimile: (208) 664- 1 6 8 4  
John P. Whelan 
2 13 N. 4th Street 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Facsimile: (208) 664-2240 I./ 
SUSAN P. W E K S  
J M S ,  VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
1875 N. L&ewood Dr, Ste. 200 
Coeur dtAlene. ID 838 14 
Telephone: (208) 667-0685 
Facsirnilc: (208) 664- 1684 
ISB M255 
STATE OF IOAH0 
COUNTY K O ~ T E H A ~ I S S  . 
FILED: 
Attorneys fot Plaintiff 
RV TEE2 DISTFUCT COURT OF TlXE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
S T A E  OF IDAHO, TN AND FOR THE COUNm OF KOOTENM 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING COMPANY, 




Case No. CV 02-7671 
MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME 
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. 
LA W N C E ,  husband and wife, 
Defendants. I 
COMES NOW the above named Plaintiff. and moves the Court for an order shortening 
the notice of time to hear Plaintiffs Application for Sixth Access. This motion is made on the 
grounds that Plaintiff requested the Court's earliest setting, which did not allow for fourken days 
notice. 
DATED this 29" day of October, 2007. 
JAMES, VERNON & mEKS,  P.A. 
k By '=r-- /-- /A 7+A 
SUSAN P. WEEKS 
51 9 
MOTION TO SHORTEN TTME; 1 
PAGE 05113 
I hereby certify that on the 29" day of October, 2007.1 caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of foregoing document by the me&od indicated below, and addressed to the 
followhg : 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Del Svmed 
Overnight Mail 
Telecopy (FAX) 
John P. !&%elan 
2 1 3 4th Street 
Coeur d8Alene, ID 838 1 6 
Facsimile: (208) 664-2240 
MOTION TO S H O R E N  TIME: 2 
I U :  L d i  I U U  i II. 3U LICltJDDY.lbtl4 JVW PAGE 0 2 / 2 2  
SUSAN P. WEEKS 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS. P.A. 
1875 N. Lsikewood Dr, Ste. 200 
Goeur dlAene, ID 83 8 3 4 
Telephone: (208) 667-0683 
Facsimile: (208) 664- I684 
ISB 64255 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
STATE OF IDAHO 
CoufiiY OF K o o i E H A l l s ~  
FILED: 
M THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STA'I'E OF TDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAJ 
Plaintiff, 
VS . 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING COMPANY, 
I 
APPLICATION FOR SIXTH 
ACCESS 
a Delaware corporation, 
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BREHDA J. 
LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 02-7671 
COMES NOW Plaintiffs, by and through their attorney. Susan P. Weeks of the firm 
JameS & Vernon & Weeks, P.A., and hereby applies to the Court for a sixth access pursuant to 
the Court's previously entered Preliminary Injunction Order. The order required that any 
subsequent accesses after the first four required applications to the Court. PlaintiRs tenant 
needs access for maintenance and winterization of the equipment on the real property. 
DATED this 27 day of October, 2007. 
JAMES & VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
SUSAN P. WEEKS 
%d 
Attorney for plainti@ 
521 
APPLICATION FOR STXW ACCESS: 1 
PAGE 03/13 
1 hereby C E R ~ ~ Y  that on the ~ 9 ' ~  &id of O ~ o b e r ,  2007, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
fnl lowing: 
U.S. Mail !Z? Ovemi gh t Mai 1 
Hand DeIivered CJ Telecopy (FAX) 
John P. Whelan 
213 N. 4*' Street 
Coeur d3Alene, ID 838 14 
Facsimile: (208) 664-2240 
APPLICATION FOR SIXTH ACCESS: 2 
STATE OF 113;AHt> $1 cc 
SUSAN P. W E K S  
JAMES, VERNON & MEKS,  P.A. 
1875 N. Lakewood Dr, Stc. 200 
Coeur #Alene, ID 83814 
Telephone: (208) 667-0683 
Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684 
TSB #4255 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT C O m T  OF THE FIRST SUI)ICIL;U, DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, TN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
Plaintiff, 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATTNG COMPANY, 
a Dclaware corporation, 
ORDER GF&4NTlNG REQUEST 
FOR SIXTH ACCESS 
Case No. CV 02-767 1 
VS. 
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BMNDA 3. 
L A W W C E ,  husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
The Court having reviewed the application of Plaintiff and the AEdavit filed in support 
tl3ereof; and it apparing that Plaintiff has utilized the four (4) accesses granted by the Caw, and a 
sixTh access being requested: 
IT TS ORDERED that Plaintiff may make a sixth access to the property pursuant 
to the original Preliminary Injunction Order entered herein. Plaintiff is required to file a Notice of 
Access of the date of the sixth access. 
DATED this '7 1 ' +ciay of 6 L +-, 2007. 
ORDER GWTING REQUEST FOR SETH ACCESS: 1 523 
PAGE 13/13 
aRTIFIGATE OF SERVICE: 
1 hercby certify that on the day of OC kf / 2007.1 caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing docment by the method indicated below, and addressed 
to the following: 
13 U.S. Mail U Ovem i ght Mail 
Hand Delivered Telecopy (FAX) 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon rB, Weeks, P.A. 
1875 N. Lakewood Dr., Suite 200 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 838 14 
Facsimile: (208) 664-1,684 
John P. Whelan 
213 N. 4th Street 
Coew d' Alene, ID 83 8 14 J 
Facsimile: (208) 664-2240 
ORDER GRANTING REQUEST FOR STXTFI ACCESS: 2 
JOHN P, WMELAN, P.C. 
2 1 3 N. 4th Street 
Cot?t.fr d'AIene, ID 8381 4 
Tele.: (208) 664-5897 
Fax: (208)664-2240 
IsBstl6083 
2007ffOY -2 AH/[: 42, 
%<'kn CLERK DtSTRlCT COURT L- 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATI NC 
COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, 
Plainriff, 
VS. 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA 
J. LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
Defendants. I 
CASE NO. CV-02-7671 
OBJECTION TO FORM OF ORDER 
GRANTING SIXTH ACCESS 
Defendants, Douglas Lawrence and Brenda Lawrence, object to the form of 
the "Order Granting Request for Sixth Access" as follows: 
The "Order" references an "AffidavitJf iled in support of Plaintiff's 
"application" when, in fact, no such affidavit had been filed in support of 
Plaintiff's application. It wou Id appear, therefore, that the order su brnitted 
misstates the facts. 
OBJECTION TO FORM OF ORDER GRANTING SIXTH ACCESS - 1 
DATED: 
JOHN P, WWELAN. P.C. 
OBJECTION TO FORM OF ORDER GRANTING SIXTH ACCESS - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
d 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2"ay of November, 2007, 1 caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to the fallowing: 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
Attorneys at Law 
1875 N. Lakewood Drive 
Suite 200 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4 
Via: U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
i/ Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684 - 
- ~ersonatly served 
Judge John T. Mitchell 
324 Garden Ave. 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 8381 4 
Via: U.5, Mail, postage prepaid 
/ Facsimile: (208) 446-1 132 
- Personally served 
JOHN P. WHELAN, P.G. 
2 1 3 N. GCh ~trcser  
Coeur d'Alene, ID 838 14 
Tele.: (208) 664-5891 
Fax: (2108) 664-2240 
ISB# 6083 
20111 MOY -7 PH 3: I5 :, < -- 
V$ 
il ERK DISTRICT COUR$b 
IM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING 
COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA 
J.  LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. CV-02-7671 
RENEWED MOTION FOR 
DISQUALIFICATION FOR CAUSE 
DATE: I TIME: 
JUDGE: JOHN T. MITCHELL 
COMES NOW the Defendants, Douglas Lawrence and Brenda Lawrence, by 
and through their attorney of record, John P. Whelan, and hereby motions this 
court for an Order for Disqualification for Cause against the Honorable John T. 
Mitchell, presiding judge in the above-entitled act.ion. This motion is made on 
MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION FOR CAUSE - 1 
the ground that Defendants believe the Honorable John T. Mitchell is biased or 
prejudiced against them o r  their case in rhis action. Phis motion is  made on the 
ground of Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 40(d)(2). 
Defendants request oral argument. 
DATED this y h d a y  of Navembei, 2007. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION FOR CAUSE - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of November, 2007, 1 caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicared below, 
and addressed to the following: 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
Attorneys at Law 
1875 N. Lakewaod Drive 
Suite 200 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8387 4 
Via: - U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
/ Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684 
- Personally served 
Judge John T. Mitchell 
324 W. Garden Ave. 
Coeur d' Alent,  ID 8381 4 
Via: U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
/ Facsimile: (208) 446-1 132 - 
- Personally served 
JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C. 
2 1 3 N. 4 I h  Street 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Tele.: (208) 664-5891 
Fax: (208) 664-2240 
15B# 6083 
STATE 3 1C1Pjll) ccuin ,LF q:~yp;?l) ss 
xr: 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING 
COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation, 
vs. 
CASE NO. CV-02-7671 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN 
IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED 
MOTION FOR 
DISQUALIFICATION FOR CAUSE 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA 




JUDGE: John T. Mitchell 
STATE OF lDAHO 1 
) ss. 
County of Kootenai ) 
I ,  John P. Whelan, being firsr duly sworn, deposes and says: 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION FOR 
CAUSE - 1 
1 .  I am the attorney for Defendants, 3ouglas Lawrence and Brenda 
Lawrence in the above-entitled case and the case of Tower Asset Sub inc. 
Lawrence, (CV-03-462 1) .  I have personal knowledge of the following facts and 
could competently testify. 
2 .  1 have previously filed the Affidavit of John P. Whelan filed on June 5 ,  
2007 in support of the Defendant" initial Motian for Disqualification for Cause 
and I incorporate herein by reference the factual allegations recited therein. 
3 .  1 also filed the Amended Supplemental Affidavit of John P. Whelan 
(with Exhibit Attached) in suppon of the Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration 
on ~ u l y  24, 2007 and I incorporate herein the factual allegations contained 
therein by reference. 
4. In addition, I have previously filed the Affidavit of John P. Whelan in 
Support of Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration on July 9, 2007. 
5 .  1 also filed the Amended Supplemental Affidavit of John P. Whelan 
(with Exhibit Attached) in support of the Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration 
on July 24, 2007 and I incorporate herein the factual allegations conrained 
therein by reference. 
6. 1 submit this affidavit in support of Defendants' Renewed Motion to 
Disqualify the Honorable John T. Mirchell for Cause pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 
40(6)(2). 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION FOR 
CAUSE - 2 
7. Since the filing of Defendam's m o t i o n  f o r  reconsiderat ion of 
Defendants' iniriai rnorion for disqualif~catioo for cause, t h e  fo l iowing additional 
events have; occurred in the herein case: 
8. 1 have f i l ed  a compla in t  with t h e  ldaho  Judic ia l  Counc i l  a l leg ing that 
Judge John T. Mi tche l l  has engaged in conduct  in the  here in  acr ion t h a t  v io lates 
the  ldaho  Code of Judicial Conduct, specifically Canon 1 ,  Canon 2A, Canon 2 6 ,  
Canon 3E(l)(a), Cannon 3B(1) ,  Canon 3B(2), 35(4), 3B(5), a n d  Canon 5 C ( 2 ) .  
9. Du r i ng  a pub l i c  hear ing in his cou r t room on October  31, 2007. 
j udge  Ni tchel f  accused m e  of lying to the  Court.  t ie made  th i s  al legat ion wh i l e  
my son, Kel len Whelan, was the  sole spectator in t he  cour t room. T h e  Judge was 
o n  the  bench when I wa lked  into the  courtroom with my son a n d  the Judge had  a 
clear view of t he  persons wa lk ing  in t o  the cour t room. The Judge accused me of 
lying to t h e  court in response to a statement I had  m a d e  in the course of 
argument t h a t  t h e  ldaho  Supreme Court had vacated t h e  in juncr ion t h a t  Judge 
Mitchel l  had issued in th i s  case when he  entered summary j u d g m e n t  in the case 
against my c l ient  (See Capsmr Radio Operating Company v. Lawrence, 1 43 l daho  
704, 1 5 2  P.3d 575 (2007))~' 1 correct/yand t r u th fu l l y rep resen ted  the facts to 
Judge Mitchell granted summary judgmenr to Plaintiff in chis action by an order dated 
June 7, 2005. The same order quieted rlrle in favor of Plaintiff and created a permanent 
injunction restraining Defendant from interfering wlth Plaintiff's use of Defendants' land. 
Additionally, the order specifically recited that "any bond posted in conjunction with the 
temporary restraining order entered herein is  hereby released," This order was appealed to the 
ldaho Supreme Court. The ldaho Supreme Court vacated the order granting summary 
Judgment. By vacating the arder granting summary judgment, the ldaho Supreme Court 
vacated the permanent injunction recited therein. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION FOR 
CAUSE - 3 
Judge Mirchel!: the injunction was, in fact, vacated when the Supreme Court 
vacated rhe order that created the permanent injunction. Judge Mitchell's 
accusation (in front of my son) that I was a liar was a gross breach of decorum 
and clearly inappropriate. The accusation is evidence of the Judge's bias and 
prejudice against me and, therefore, my clients. 
10. Three days prior to the October 31, 2007 hearing where Judge 
Mitchell cailed me a liar, counsel for Plainriff, Susan Weeks, flled an application 
for an order shortening time and a Motion for Sixth Access [sic]. Neither motion 
was supported by an affidavit and neither motion referenced a rule basis for the 
motion as required by 1.R.C.P Rule ?(b)(l), At the hearing, I objected to the 
"application" and the "motion" on the grounds that no supporting affidavit was 
filed and no rule basis was cited, 1 argued that Plaintiff had failed to 
demonstrate grounds for a order shortening time. My objections were 
summarily overruled. I further argued that the bond that had been ordered and 
posted for the temporary restraining order issued early on in this case had been 
exonerated by the Court's June 7, 2005 order granting summary judgment, 
therefore no bond was in place (as Plaintiff had recovered the bond on May 3, 
2006). 1 funher argued that, at a minimum, a bond should be ordered posted 
by Plaintiff to replace the bond exonerated, The argument was summarily 
dismissed by Judge Mitchell even though I.R.C.P. 65(c) mandates that "no 
restraining order or preliminary injunction shall issue except upon the giving of 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHEL4N IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR DISQUALIFIaTION FOR 
CAUSE - 4 
I i t J i : ' i ' J U  i 10 [ J L  r , ? ~  ~ ) ~ W L C \ ) I J  ( J  II I 1 . 4  I ,$ I ,  ,, . r t , ,  , , , ~ ,  , < A  .. ,.- , , % - ,  . -a " " , , :  "".' 
security by the applicanr. judge Mitchell has seemingly refused to follow rhe 
law.' 
1 1 .  It is abundant ly clear that Judge Mitchell applies a d i f ferent  srandard 
of conduct t o  Plaintiff 's counsel than he applies to your affiancI3 as both the 
Application for Order  Shortening Time and the Mot ion f o r  S i x ~ h  Access [sic] was 
granted without c i t ing any ru le basis. 
12. On October 31, 2007, Plaintiff's counsel submi t ted  an  order t o  
Judge Mitchell enrirled "Order Granting Request For Sixth Access." The order 
referenced that "the Cour t  having reviewed the application of  Plainti f f  .and the  
affidavit in s u ~ ~ o r t  thereof. .." (emphasis added). In fact. no aff idavi t  had been 
f i led in support of PlaintiFf's application, a point  argued by y o u r  affiant. When 
your  affiant received the  signed order. an "Objection to Form of Order Granting 
Sixth Access" was f i led on November 2, 2007, the. very day that your affiant f i rs t  
saw the signed order. Apparently, n o  action has been taken to correct the  false 
reference in the Court order.  Again, it would appear that Judge Mitchel l  applies 
The findings required by I.R.C.P. Rule 65(d) also were not in the order granting sixth 
access, which was essenrially a mandarory injunction. The Rule 6S(d) findings were not in the 
original preliminary injunction order either. 
3 See Affidavit of John P, Whelan f i led June 5 ,  2007. In the case of Srraub v. Smith, 
(CV-04-5437), Judge Mitchell denied John P, Whelan's prevailing cllent anorney fees pursuant 
to a standard real estate purchase contract containing an attorney fee clause because John P. 
Whelan had allegedly failed to  reference a rule (1.R.C.P) basis for hls motion. In fact, a rule basis 
was sited and Judge Mitchell apparently did not read the motion before denying iT. 
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a double standard when it comes to misrepresentations to the Courr made by 
Plaintiff's counsel. A true and correct copy of the order is attached as Exhibit A.' 
13. Lasrly, Judge Mitchell scheduled both the Capsrar case (CV-02- 
7671) and the Tower Asset case (CV-03-4621) for trial wirhour issu~ng a 
scheduling order. It i s  my understanding that of the Judges In the First 
District routinely issue scheduling orders in every civil case. The absence of 
scheduling orders tn the cases at hand seemingly benefits the  Plaintiffs, and 
Plaintiff's counsel, in each case in that Plaintiff' does not have to disclose the 
witness and evidence disclosures required in all other civil cases in the First 
District, thus the Defendants in this case are placed at a distinct disadvantage. 
None of the time deadlines established by the routine scheduling order utilized 
byjudge Mitchell apply to the Plaintiff in this case. 
14, 1 believe that Judge Mitchell i s  biased and prejudiced against 
Defendants's counsel, your affiant, and that disqualification for cause is  
warranted by I.R.C.P. Rule 40(d)(2). I also believe that the Judge's impartiality is  
reasonably questioned in this case and that the Judge has failed to follow 
accepted rules of decorum. I also believe that the following Judicial Canons have 
been violated by fudge Mitchell: Canon 1 , Canon 2A, Canon 28 ,  Canon 3E(l )(a), 
Cannon 36(1), Canon 3B(2), 3B(4), 38(5), and Canon SC(2). 
4 The Coun is requested to take notice of the judicial records referred to here in as well 
as the  Court Clerk records regarding the exoneration of t h e  bond p o s ~ e d  by Plaintiff. 
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l i I, I . i v i ,  , I C, Vi. . ,,ii , > , , - , - . .  - > ,  , . . .  . , .....a,, 1 
DATED this r d t d a y  of  November, 2007. 
JOHN P. WHEMN, P.C. - 
Subscribed and sworn before me this 7* day of November, 2007. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHEIAN IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR DISQUALlFlCATlON FOR 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 7T4 day of November, 2007, 1 caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to the following- 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
Attorneys at taw 
1875 N. Lakewood Drive 
Suite 200 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4 
Via: U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
I /  Facsimile: (208)  664-1 684 
- Personally served 
Judge John T, Mitchell 
3 2 4  W. Garden Ave?. 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4 
Via: U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
/Facsimile: (208) 446-1 132 - 
Personally served 
Jes ca Tvrdy  
SUSAN P. WEEKS 
liAmS, ZJFRYfaTJ % WEKS, P.A. 
1875 N. L a k m d  Dr, Ste 2200 
Goeur d'Alme, ID 838 14 
Teic~hoae; 1208) 657-WX3 
Faat;zmila; (208) 664-1 684 
'lSB #4255 
STATE OF IDAI-IC) t ,, 
llcr THE DTSTRICT COURT OF TFIE FRST m I C I h t  DISTRICT OF T'HE 
STAm OF IDAHO, Fii A7TD FOR TEE COWTY OF KOOENAI 
CAPSTAX. RADIO OPERAnNG COWANY, 
a Ddawar~ corporation, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS LAtvRBNCE a d  BRENDA J. 
LAWRENCE, hwband and wife, 
h e  No.. CV 02-767 1 
OmER G- REQUEST 
FOR SIXTH ACCESS 
The Court having, m i d  the applicat& of P l H  and the Amdavit filed in support 
t l ~ e n u t  and it a p p d g  that Plaintiff has utilized fhc four (4) acecases grmtod by the C o w  and a 
sixth access bchg requestad: 
IT TS E,FU%Y O R D m  that flMff may nake n s j , d  access ta the property pursuant 
to the original IP~lMraiy Iajunctim O d m  en- berein. Pbt i f f  is q u i d  to file a Notice of  
Access of the date of the sixth access. 
DATED this ,? 1 stday~f 6 L, 2007. 
day o f  
true and conect copy of the foregoing documeot by the method indicatd below, and addressed 
to the fogadfig: 
U.S. -Mail Ovcmj,ght ikfd 
Telccopy (FAX) 
Susm P. W ~ a  
James, V m o n  & Weeks, PA. 
1875 N. Lakewood Dr,, guitc 200 
Coeur dFAbne, ID 83814 
Fassimilc: (208) 664-1684 1 
John P. Pmefan 
21 3 N, 4" Strrt=t 
C a m  d7Altnc, LL) 53814 J 
Facsimile: (208) 664-2240 
JOHN P. VIHEMN, P.C. 
2 1 3 N. 4th Srreet 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 8381 4 
Tele.: (208) 664-5891 
Fax; (205)  664-2240 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING 
COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA 
J. LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. CV-02-7671 
RENEWED MOTION FOR 
PERMISSION TO APPEAL FROM 
AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER 
DATE: November 27, 2007 
TINE: 3:30 p.m. 
JUDGE: JOHN T, MITCHELL 
CONES NOW the Defendants, Douglas Lawrence and Brenda Lawrence, by 
and through their attorney of record, John P. Whelan, and hereby motions this 
court, pursuant to Rules 12(a) and 12(b) of the Idaho Appellate Rules for an 
Order for Permission to Appeal from an Interlocutory Order, Defendants request 
RENEWED MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL FROM AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER - 1 
an Order granting rbem permission ta appeal if Defendants' Renewed Notron for 
Disqualification for Cause  i s  denied. 
This motion is  made an the grounds that goad cause was shown for the 
renewed motion f o r  disquali f icatian, and Defendants' bel ieve that they  cannot 
obtain a fair  t r ia l  from Judge John T. Mitchell. The matter i s  scheduled for trial 
on December 7 0, 2007, therefore Defendants' request is an urgent request, 
Defendants request o ra l  argument. 
DATED this 1 day of November, 2007. 
Respecrfully Subrnirred, , 
MOTION FOR PERMlSSlON TO APPEAL FROM AN \NTERLOCUTORY ORDER - 2 
d 
I HEREBY CERTIFY rhar on the ( Z  day of November, 2007, 1 caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the faregoing by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to the following: 
Susan P, Weeks 
James, Vernon &I Weeks 
Attorneys at Law 
1875 N. Lakewood Drive 
Suiitc 200 
Coeur d' Aleme, ID 8381 4 
Via: U.5, Nail, postage prepaid 
t/ Facsimile: (7108) 664-1 684 
Personally served 
SUSAN P. lYEEKS 
JANIES? VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
1 626 Lincoln Way 
Coew d'hlme, n) 338 14 
Telephone: (208) 667-0633 
TSB #255 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN A I D  FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CAPSTAR RADlO OPERATING COMPANY, 
a Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
Case No. CV 02-7671 
RESPONSE TO SECOND 
MOTTON TO DISQUALIFY 
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BFlENDA J.  
L A m m G E ,  husband and wife, 
Defendants. 1 
STANDARD FOR MOTION' TO DISQUALIFY 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 40(d)(2)(A)(4) 'bDisqualification for cause" provides 
that: "(A) Grounds. Any party to a.n action nay disqualify a judge or magistrate for cause from 
presiding in any action upon any of the following grounds: . . . @]hat the judge or ,magistrate is 
biased or prejudiced for or against any party or the case in the action." Orders on motions to 
disqualify are evaluated according to abuse-of-discretion rules. Samuel v. Heporth,  Nungester 
& Lezamiz, Iptc., 134 Idaho 84, 88,996 P.2d 303,307 (2000). 
ARGWIENT 
RESPONSE TO SECOND MOTION TO DISQUALIFY: 1 
Defendants' counsel claims that the ma1 iudge is prejudiced against Defendants' case 
bccausc thcir attorney ~ a c e i v e s  that the judge beats him disparately. The new facts that counscl 
provides in support of the renewed motion asc: ( I )  Dcfmdmts counst.11 has filed a judicial 
complaint against the trial judge based upon actions in the present case; (2) no scheduling order 
was issued in either Capstau Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, Kootenai County Case Na. GV- 
02-7671 or l"nwer Asset Sub 1). Lawrence, Kootenai County Case No. CV-03-4621; (3) the judge 
allegedly calld counsel a liar in h n t  of his son; and (4) the Court applies a different standard to 
plaintiffs counsel based upon an order entered by the Court. 
Althou& the Court has previously noted that it has made rulings both in favor and 
against Defendant's counsel, Defendant's counsel continues to claim that hjs perception that the 
trial judge has animosity toward him which prejudices his client. Plaintiff is not in a position to 
look into the subjective mind of the court and answer such allegation. However, from an 
objective point of view, plaintiff has not observed those things of which Dcfendant's counsel 
complains. Thae was a scheduIing order issued in Case No. CV-02-7671 on December 12, 
2003. There was not one issued in Case No. CV-03-462 1. Plaintiff's counsel has observed this 
oversight in other cases by other judges. It has been her practice to notify the court clerk when 
there is such an oversight. If Defendants felt this oversight in Casc No. CV-03-4621 prejudiced 
them, they certainly were aware oF this fact and had every opportunity to bring it to the court's 
attention. Objectively, an oversight (which may well have occurred long before Mr. Whelnn was 
the attorney of record) docs not establish prejudice on the part of the court. 
RESPONSE TO SECOND MOTION TO DISQUALIFY: 2 
Deferldmts are correct that the order preser~ted by Plintiff for thc Sixth Access 
referenced rtn affidavit \when no such affidavit was presented snd the Court signed it. The order 
was rnodeled after a previous order and should have been modified. The failure tct rnodifjr it was 
the fault ofplaintifrs counsel. not the court. However. this fact alone is not indicative that the 
court is prejudiced against Defendant or treats the plaintiffs counsel better than defendant. In 
fact, the same situation occurred when Defendants presented their ordn on judicial notice. The 
order p r e s a t d  by Defmdants and cntercd by the court on Septe-mber 11,2007 was not 
consistent with the ruling made in court. Plaintiff brought a motion ta conect the judgment as  
allowed by the rules. Defendant is afforded the same opportunity. The mere fact that an order 
was presented and subsequently entered that was inconsistent with the ruling i s  not indicative of 
prejudice by the Court toward the presenting counsel. If it was, the logical conclusion in this 
matter is that the trial court is prejudiced against both parties because it has entered orders for 
both that wmc incorrect, which leads to the ~~onsensical conclusion that this court will rule in 
neither parbes favor and both parties favor. 
As to the claim that the court called MI. Whelm a liar, both plaintiff's counsel and the 
court disagreed with Mr. Whelm's characterization of the Supreme Court's opinion. However, 
plaintiff's counsel does not recollect the court calling Mr. Whelan a liar. Plaintiffs counsel's 
recollect was that the court indicated that Mr. Whelan was not being truthfi.11 when he 
represented that the Supreme Court revmscd the preliminary injunction when it remanded the 
matter. However, the record is the better source for reference on this matter. 
RESPONSE TO SECOND MOTION TO DISQUALIFY: 3 
Perhaps Mr. me1an.s perceptions me shaped by his own internal vicxvs. PlaiatifPs 
co~inseI does not perceive the tsansgcssions pcrccived by Mr. %%elan. 
DATED this 20th day of Novmbm, 200'7. 
JAMES, VEKqON & WEEKS, P.A. 
B 
SUSAN P. WEEKS 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVJCE 
1 h a b y  certify that on the 20'~ day of Novcmbn, 2007, I caused to be sewed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing donunent by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
U.S. Mail D Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivacd l z f  Telecopy (FAX) 
John P. Whelan 
213 4"' Street 
Coe~rr d' Alene, ID 83 8 1 6 
Facsimile: (208) 664-2240 
RESPONSE TO SECOND MOTION TO DISQUALIFY: 4 
County of K O O T E N P L -  ISS 
f 
FILED - 2 - ,- 
A ,  
,AT - O ' C f o c k  ! M 
CLERK OF DISTRICT!COURT 
i ,. / :,I j id iL , 1- 4 L ~ 2  *+$ L. - Deputy 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
) 
TOWER ASSET, INC., a Delaware ) 
Corporation, ) case NO. CV 2003 4621 
1 
Plain tigs , 
) 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
) 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' 
RENEWED MOTION FOR 
1 PERMISSION TO APPEAL FROM AN 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. ) 
) 
INTERLOCUTORY ORDER, I.A.R. 12 




CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING COMPANY,) 




MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
1 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' 
VS. RENEWED MOTION FOR 
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DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. ) 
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INTERLOCUTORY ORDER, I.A.R. 12 




On November 13,2007, Defendants Douglas and Brenda Lawrence (Lawrences) 
filed a "Renewed Motion for Permission to Appeal From an Interlocutory Order" in each of 
the above cases. The interlocutory order sought to be appealed was an interlocutory 
order that did not exist as of November 13, 2007. In their motion, Lawrences "request an 
Order granting them permission to appeal ZDefendants' Renewed Motion for 
548 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' RENEWED MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL FROM AN 
t .t~rnt  PI lTnnV nonro Pane I 
Disqualification for Cause is denied." Motion for Permission to Appeal From an 
Interlocutory Order, pp. 1-2. (emphasis added). On November 7, 2007, Lawrences filed 
a "Renewed Motion for Disqualification for Cause" in each of the above cases. That 
Renewed Motion for Disqualification for Cause was not heard until November 27, 2007. 
After oral argument by counsel for all parties on November 27,2007, the Lawrences' 
Renewed Motion for Disqualification for Cause was denied on the record, and the 
reasons for that denial were stated on the record. After the denial of the Lawrences' 
Renewed Motion for Disqualification for Cause, this Court heard oral argument on 
Lawrences' Renewed Motion for Permission to Appeal From an lnterlocutory Order. That 
matter was taken under advisement. Thus, though prematurely filed on November 13, 
2007, Lawrences' Renewed Motion for Permission to Appeal From an lnterlocutory Order 
is now at issue. 
The reason this is Lawrences "Renewed" Motion for Permission to Appeal From an 
lnterlocutory Order, is back on July 9, 2007, Lawrences filed their Motion for Permission 
to Appeal From an lnterlocutory Order, in which they requested "an Order granting them 
permission to appeal the Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Motion for 
Disqualification for Cause, I.R.C.P. 40(d)(2) filed June 25, 2007." Motion for Permission 
to Appeal From an lnterlocutory Order, pp. 1-2. That motion was denied on the record at 
oral argument on August 6, 2007. 
Since the Lawrences furnished no briefing in support of their Renewed Motion for 
Permission to Appeal From an lnterlocutory Order, the Court took the Lawrences' 
Renewed Motion for Permission to Appeal From an lnterlocutory Order under advisement 
on November 27, 2007, so that it could review the briefing regarding the Lawrences' initial 
Motion for Permission to Appeal From an lnterlocutory Order. A review of the Court file 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' RENEWED MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL FROM AN 
I*ITCnl nPI ITnDY n O n C D  Paae 2 
shows there was no brleflng flled at the earl~er notton elther The Court has revlewed the 
reasons set forth on the record for the dental of the Lawrences' lnltial Motton for 
Permlsslon to Appeal From an lnterlocutory Order. Those same reasons apply to the 
Renewed Motion for Permission to Appeal From an Interlocutory Order. Those reasons 
are as follows 
11, ANALYSIS. 
ldaho Appellate Rule 12 is a discretionary rule, allowing that permission to appeal 
an interlocutory order "may" be granted, but only when certain things exist. ldaho 
Appellate Rule 12 requires two things, at least the first of which must exist in order for a 
trlal court to grant a motion for permission to appeal an interlocutory order. The order 
must first involve "a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial grounds for 
difference of opinion" and second, "an immediate appeal from the order.. .may materially 
advance the orderly resolution of the litigation." I.A.R. 12(a). (italics added). This Court 
Interprets the second criteria as not a requirement, but a factor to be considered by the 
trial court in its discretion. 
At the August 6, 2007 hearing, this Court commented that there was no issues of 
controlling case law that were articulated by the Lawrences in their motion to disqualify. 
That is again the case following the November 27, 2007 hearing on Lawrences' Renewed 
Motion for Permission to Appeal From an lnterlocutory Order. The Lawrences furnished 
no case law on the issue of disqualification, nor on the issue of permissive appeal. On 
the issue of disqualification, the Court cited on the record several cases it had reviewed 
as to why it was denying the renewed motion for disqualification. While these cases cited 
support both granting and denying a motion for disqualification, the reason is they are 
naturally fact driven. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' RENEWED MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL FROM AN 
I~.LTTDL nrl lrnov noncm Paqe 3 
Even if this Court could get beyond the lack of an issue of controlling case law as 
to whlch there is substantial grounds for difference of opinion, from a practical standpoint, 
an immediate appeal from this Court's decisions on renewed motions for disqualification 
would not "materially advance the orderly resolution of the litigation." If this Court later 
rules in favor of Lawrences on summary judgment (both cases now have pending 
motions for summary judgment brought by defendants in each case) in each case, and 
the cases proceed to trial, and Lawrences prevail at trial, the Lawrences would be unlikely 
to have any incentive to appeal this Court's decisions regarding their motions to 
disqualify. If this Court later rules in favor of Lawrences on summary judgment in both 
cases, but against Lawrences at trial in Capstar and a jury rules against Lawrences at trial 
in TowerAsset, then the Lawrences could appeal the rulings on the motions to disqualify 
as well as any other issue they would like, including issues that may arise during the trials 
now scheduled about six months from the date of this decision. If this Court later rules 
against Lawrences on summary judgment in these cases, then the Lawrences can appeal 
that decision and appeal the rulings on the motions to disqualify as well as the rulings on 
summary judgment. 
Ill. ORDER. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that in the exercise of this Court's discretion, for the 
reasons set forth above, defendants' Renewed Motion for Permission to Appeal From an 
Interlocutory Order in Capstar v. Lawrence, CV 2002 7671 and identical motion filed in 
Tbwer Asset Sub, Inc. v. Lawrence, CV 2003 4621, are DENIED. 
Entered this J p d a y  of November, 2007. 
T' &&L- - 
ell, District Judge 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' RENEWED MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL FROM AN --..---.. ----- Paae 4 
Certificate of Service 
I certify that on the -3'. day of November, 2007, a true copy of the foregoing was 
mailed postage prepaid or was sent by interoffice mail or facsimile to each of the following 
Lawyer - Fax # i Lawyer Fax # 
John P Whelan 208 664-2240 - Susan Weeks 
Secretary V 
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S .  E OF IDAHO j 
County of KOOTENAI )'' 
AT/: t Z  0;Clock M 
R 
CLERK OF DISTqlGT COURT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
) 
TOWER ASSET SUB, INC., a Delaware ) 
Corporation, ) case NO. CV 2003 4621 
) 
Pain tiffs, ) MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
) 
) 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S 
VS. 
) 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, AND ORDER 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. ) GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
LAWRENCE, husband and wife, ) TO SUBSTITUTE REAL P A R N  IN 
) 
Defendants. 1 INTEREST 
1 
) 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING COMPANY,) 




MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
) 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S 
VS . 
) 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. ) 




Although one decision is being filed in each of these two cases, these two cases 
are not consolidated. At the November 27, 2007, hearing on various motions in both 
cases, counsel for defendants in each of these two cases indicated on the record that he 
would be pursuing a motion to consolidate on behalf of his clients. No such motion has 
been filed. Although one decision is filed in each of these two cases, this decision will 553 
d~scuss each case separately 
At the conclus~on of the November 27, 2007, hearlng, thls Court stated that the 
rul~ng on the upcoming summary judgment rnotlon (heard November 28, 2007) would be 
taken under adv~sement and that the decislon on summary judgment would not be issued 
until after this Court filed its decision on "Defendant's Renewed Motion for Permission to 
Appeal from an Interlocutory Order, I.A.R. 12". This Court entered its "Memorandum 
Decision and Order Denying Defendant's Renewed Motion for Permission to Appeal from 
an Interlocutory Order, I.A.R. 12" on November 30,2007. On December 17,2007, 
defendants in both cases filed a "Motion for Permissive Appeal" with the ldaho Supreme 
Court. On January 25, 2008, this Court received notice that on January 17, 2008, the 
ldaho Supreme Court denied defendants' Motion for Permissive Appeal in each of these 
two cases. Accordingly, summary judgment in each of these two cases is at issue. 
Oral argument on the summary judgment motion brought by plaintiffs in both cases 
was heard November 28,2007. 
Capstar Radio Operating Company and Tower Sub Asset (collectively the 
"Plaintiffs") filed suit to declare the existence of an easement over property owned by 
Douglas and Brenda Lawrence, the defendants in each of the two cases. Due to a 
discovery dispute, summary judgment was limited to only the issue of express 
easement. Oral argument on the express easement theory was heard in these two 
cases at two different times. This Court granted summary judgment in favor of Tower 
Asset Sub against Lawrences on May 27, 2005, and this Court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Capstar against Lawrences on June 7, 2005. Lawrences appealed 
this Court's finding of an express easement in both cases to the ldaho Supreme Court. 
On January 26, 2007, the ldaho Supreme Court vacated the summary judgment in both 
cases and remanded to this Court "for further proceedings consistent with this opinion." 
Capstar v Labvrence, 2007 Oprnron No 13, p 7, Tower Asset Sub, Inc. v Lawrence, 
2007 Oprnion No. 14, p. 7. The Supreme Court noted that although the plaintiffs did not 
have an express easement, it appeared that the case might have been concluded on 
summary judgment based upon the plaintiffs' other theories. The ldaho Supreme Court 
wrote in Capstar: ''It is unfortunate that the district court confined the summary 
judgment proceeding to the express easement issue, as it appears the case might have 
been brought to a conclusion based on evidence that was submitted with respect to 
Capstar's other theories but not considered on summary judgment." Capstar v. 
Lawrence, 2007 Opinion No. 1 3 ,  p. 7 .  A similar statement was made by the ldaho 
Supreme Court in TowerAsset Sub, lnc.: 
Final resolution of this case would have been expedited, had the district 
court not confined its inquiry to the express easement issue. Based on 
evidence submitted to the court, certain of the other theories showed 
greater promise from Tower's standpoint and it is unfortunate that those 
theories were not fully developed and decided upon. 
TowerAssef Sub, lnc. v. Lawrence, 2007 Opinion No. 14, p. 7. On May 14, 2007, the 
plaintiffs in each case filed a "Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment", which again 
raised for this Court's consideration the other theories of easement advanced in 
plaintiffs' previous motions for summary judgment, but not decided upon by this Court in 
its initial decisions on summary judgment in 2005. 
11. ANALYSIS REGARDING CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING CO. v. LAWRENCE. 
A. Facts Pertaining to Capstar Radio Operating Co., v. Lawrence. 
Blossom Mountain is located south of Post Falls, Idaho. The Lawrences and 
Capstar own parcels of property on Blossom Mountain. Both the Capstar parcel and 
the Lawrences' parcel (Lawrence parcel) were once part of a larger tract held under 
common ownership by Harold and Marlene Funk. The Lawrence parcel was broken out 
in 1975 when Funks sold that parcel to Human Synerg~st~cs (Aff~dav~t of Susan Weeks 
1r-i Support of Mot~on for Surnmaryl Judgment, p 2, il 1 e , Exhibit E), and the Capstar 
parcel was broken out in 1989 when Funks so\d that parcel to Kootenai Broadcasting, 
Inc. (Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion far Summary Judgment, p. 5, 73.3, 
Exhibit Q). The Lawrence parcel is located in the southeast quarter of Section 21, and 
the Capstar parcel is located to the east of the Lawrences' parcel in the southwest 
quarter of Section 22. Section 21 iies directly west of Section 22. Affidavit of Susan 
Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 7, 7 8, Exhibit Z. There is a 
public road in the area known as Signal Point Road. Signal Point Road lies generally to 
the west of the Lawrence parcel, which in turn is west of Capstar's parcel. Capstar 
seeks an easement to access its property from Signal Point Road over an unimproved 
private road commonly known as Blossom Mountain Road. Blossom Mountain Road 
crosses through the Lawrence parcel before passing near the Capstar parcel. In 
litigation in yet another case, Douglas Lawrence, in his deposition taken September 30, 
2003, recognized the right of way easement General Telephone Corporation (GTC) 
obtained in July 1966 for access to GTC's property in Section 22 over the private road 
that crossed the southwest quarter of Section 21 (Lawrences' parcel). Affidavit of 
Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 6-7, m 5 - 7 ,  Exhibit W, 
X and Y. The detail of the access road prepared by GTC's engineer in 1967 shows the 
road leaves Signal Point Road, then travels southeast through the southwest portion of 
Section 21 (Lawrences' parcel), then enters the north half of Section 28 were it then 
turned northeast and entered the southeast quarter of Section 21. Id. Exhibit Y, and 
Exhibit 15 attached to Exhibit Y 
Capstar and Tower Asset have proven the following chain of title for the parcels 
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involved in Sections 21 and 22: 
I Reynolds to the Radens and t he  Mareos (Contract rn 1968, Deed In 1974). 
A.fFrdavrl of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset 
case filed August 17, 20041, Exh~bits A and D Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support 
of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9, 2004), Exhibits A 
and D. 
2. Radens and Marcos to Funk (Contract in 1969, Deed in 1974): Affidavit of 
Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset case filed 
August 17, 2004), Exhibits B and C. Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion 
for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9, 2004), Exhibits B and C. 
To this point there was unity of title in the portions of Sections 21 and 22 at issue in this 
case. 
Capstar and Tower Asset have established the title chain with respect to what 
became the Lawrence property located in the southeast quarter of Section 21 as: 
1. Funk to Human Synergistics (Sale Agreement in 1975, Deed in 1992): 
Supplemental Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment (Tower Asset case filed November 2,2004), E and I; Affidavit of 
Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset 
case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits A and F; Affidavit of Susan Weeks in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9, 
2004), Exhibit A and F. 
2. Human Synergistics to Johnston & McHugh (Contract and Deed May 16, 
1977): Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment (Tower Asset case filed August 17,2004), Exhibits F and H; 
Aff~davlt of Susan Weeks In Suppod of Motion for Summary Judgment 
(Capstar case filed March 9, 2004). Exhib~ts F and H 
3 Johnston & McHugh to N.A.P. (Sale Agreement October 6, 1987, Deed July 
16. 1996) Affidavit of Susan Weeks In Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment (Tower Asset case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits G and 0; 
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
(Capstar case filed March 9, 2004), Exhibits G and 0. 
4 N.A.P. to Farmanian (Deeds June 28, 1996 and July 8, 1996)): Affidavit of 
Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset 
case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits J and K; Affidavit of Susan Weeks in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9, 
2004), Exhibits J and K. 
5. Farmanian to Douglas and Brenda Lawrence (Sale Agreement July 12, 1996, 
Deed July 5, 1996): Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment (Tower Asset case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits L, M, 
N and P; Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9, 2004), Exhibits L, M, N and P. 
Capstar establishes the title chain with respect to what became the Capstar property in 
the southwest corner of Section 22 as: 
1. Funk to Kootenai Broadcasthg (Deed September 22, 1989): Affidavit of 
Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case 
filed March 9, 2004), Exhibits Q and R. 
2 Kootena~ Broadcast~ng to Rook Broadcasting (Deed October 25, 1993)' 
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
(Capstar case filed March 9, 2004) Exhibrt S 
3 Rook Broadcasting to AAGM (Deed November 20, 1998): Affidavit of Susan 
Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed 
March 9, 2004), Exhibit T. 
4. AGM to Capstar (Deed October 25, 2000): Affidavit of Susan Weeks in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9, 
2004), Exhibit U. 
Capstar asserts that prior to the separation by the Funks of the Lawrences' 
parcel from the parent parcel in 1975, the private road across the Section 21 parcel had 
been used by the Funks as the exclusive means to access their property in Sections 21 
and 22. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (filed March 9, 
2004), pp. 4-5, 77 7-9. Capstar asserts that even after the separation of Section 21, the 
Funks continued to use the private easement road to access their Section 22 parcel. 
Id., pp. 5-6, 77 10-12. Capstar argues the road was also later used by Kootenai 
Broadcasting, lnc, for access to its segregated parcel in Section 22. This claim is 
proven by the Affidavit of John Rook in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 
March 9, 2004. John Rook was the President of Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc. Rook's 
testimony is uncontroverted. 
The chain of title as to both the Lawrence parcel and the Capstar parcel is set 
forth in the Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 
March 9, 2004, and attached exhibits thereto. In 1975, the Funks agreed to sell the 
Lawrence parcel to Human Synergistics, Inc. In 1992, the Funks gave Human 
Synergistics a warranty deed that stated it was "given in fulfillment of those certain 
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contracts between the parties hereto dated July 1 ,  I975 and cond~tloned for the 
conveyance of the above described property " Thrs property passed through several 
other hands before the Lawrences purchased ~t in 1996 
When the Lawrences questroned Capstar's right to access its property over the 
portion of Blossom Mountain Road that traversed their property, Capstar filed suit on 
November 7, 2002, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Tower Asset filed a similar 
suit on June 27,2003. Capstar and Tower Asset sought to have an easement declared 
based on four theories: express easement, easement by implication, easement by 
necessity, and prescriptive easement. On plaintiffs' previous motion for summary 
judgment, this court found that plaintiffs held an express easement over the Lawrence 
property based on the sale agreement, as well as the deed. The Court did not address 
Capstar's other theories. The Lawrences appealed from that decision and the Supreme 
Court reversed summary judgment holding the deed did not create an express 
easement over the Lawrence property. On remand, the plaintiffs renew their motion for 
summary judgment based on the other theories of easement previously advanced by 
Capstar. 
B. Easement by Implication from Prior Use. 
An easement can be formed by implication from prior use. Creation of 
easements by implication rests upon exceptions to the rule that written instruments 
speak for themselves, and because implied easements are contrary to that rule, the 
courts disfavor them. Sutton v. Brown, 91 ldaho 396, 400, 422 P.2d 63, 67 (1966); 
Cordwell v. Smith, 105 ldaho 71, 77, 665 P.2d 1081, 1087 (Ct. App. 1983). An 
easement is implied because it is presumed that if an access was in use at the time of 
severance it was meant to continue. Bob Daniels and Sons v. Weaver, 105 ldaho 535, 
542, 681 P.2d 101 0, 101 7 (Ct. App. 1984). Easements by implication rest on the view SoC 
that land should not be rendered unfit for use due to a lack of access. Id. 
In order to establish an easement by ~mplicat~on from prior use, the party 
attempting to estabiish such easement must prove 3 )  unity of title or ownership and 
subsequent separation by grant of the domrnant estate; 2) apparent continuous use; 
and 3) the easement must be reasonably necessary to the proper enjoyment of the 
dominant estate. Bear Island Water Association v. Brown, 125 ldaho 71 7, 725, 874 
P.2d 528, 536 (1 994); Cordwell v. Smith, 105 ldaho 71, 77, 665 P.2d 1081, 1087 
(Ct.App 1983); Close v. Rensick, 95 ldaho 72, 76, 501 P.2d 1383, 1387 (1972); Davis 
v. Gowen, 83 ldaho 204, 210, 360 P.2d. 403, 406-07. See also Phillips Industries, Inc. 
v. Firkins, 121 ldaho 693, 698, 827 P.2d 706, 71 1 (Ct. App. 1992); and Davis v. 
Peacock, 133 ldaho 637, 642, 991 P.2d 362, 367 (1 999). Apparent continuous use 
refers to the use before the separation of the parcels that would indicate the roadway 
was intended to provide permanent access to the parcels. Cordwell, 105 ldaho at 78, 
665 P.2d at 1088. The party seeking to establish the easement has the burden of 
providing the facts to establish the easement. Id., 105 ldaho at 77, 665 P.2d at 1087. 
In Davis v. Peacock, 133 ldaho 637, 641-42, 991 P.2d 362, 366-67 (1999), the ldaho 
Supreme Court held that successors in interest to the original grantors of property could 
assert easement rights by implied or prior use. 
Strict necessity is not required for the creation of an implied easement by prior 
use. All that is required is reasonable necessity. Davis v. Peacock, 133 ldaho 637, 991 
P.2d 362 (1999); Thomas v. Madsen, 142 ldaho 635, 132 P.3d 392 (2006). 
Reasonable necessity is something less than the great present necessity required for 
an easement implied by necessity. Davis, 133 ldaho at 642. Furthermore, the 
easement by implication is not extinguished if the easement no longer exists or is no 
longer reasonably necessary Id at 643 The Idaho Supreme Court further noted in 
Davis: 
This long standing rule is based on the theory that when someone 
conveys property. they also intend to convey whatever is required for the 
beneficial use and enjoyment of that property, and intends to retain all that 
is required for the use and enjoyment of the land retained. Consequently, 
an easement implied by prior use is a true easement of a permanent 
duration, rather than a temporary easement which exists only as long as 
the necessity continues. See, e.g., Norken v. McGahan, 823 P.2d 622, 
631 (Alaska 1991); Thompson v. Schuh, 286 Or. 201, 593 P.2d 1 138, 
1145 (1 979); Story v. Hefner, 540 P.2d 562, 566 (Okla.1975). Additionally, 
an implied easement by prior use is appurtenant to the land and therefore 
passes with all subsequent conveyances of the dominant and servient 
estates. See Hughes v. State, 80 ldaho 286, 328 P.2d 397 (1 958); I.C. § 
55-603 (stating that a transfer of real property also includes all easements 
attached to the property). 
Id. 
There can be no dispute that the first element has been proven. As to use and 
reasonable necessity, Harold Funk testified in his affidavit that when he and his wife 
Marlene purchased parts of Section 21 and 22 in 1969, there was "an existing private 
easement road used for access that crossed the Southeast Quarter of Section 21 and 
entered into the Southwest Quarter of Section 22 and provided access to these two 
parcels and access to the General Telephone Company parcel [GTC owned about one 
acre in Section 221." Affidavit of Harold Funk in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment, p. 2, I n  2-3. This is the same easement road referenced in the Real Estate 
Contract between Funks and their predecessor in interest, the Radens, over which 
General Telephone Company had a recorded easement for access. Id. p. 2, 7 3, 
Exhibit A. This was the Funks only access into Section 21. Id. p. 3, 7 4. When Funks 
sold their portion of Section 21 to Human Synergistics (Lawrences' predecessor) in 
1975, Funks still owned their land in Section 22, and the sales agreement to Human 
Synergistics included "Item 5" in the Sales Agreement that "...indicated that the Section 
L A 4  
21 parcel was belng sold subject to an ~ngressiegress easement over the existing road 
on the property that was being sold to Human Synergistics." Id p 3. 6 Wlthout 
those terms Funks' Sectron 21 property would have been landlocked, and that was not 
Harold Funk's intent. Id. Harold Funk testified that following the sale [to Human 
Synergistics], we continuously utilized the existing road in Section 21 to access Funks' 
property in Section 22.. Id. p. 4, 7. 6. That Sales Agreement was recorded as well. Id. 
In 1989 Funks sold part of their Section 22 property to Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc., 
and Funks knew Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc. was going to use that parcel for 
construction of a broadcasting tower. Id. p. 4, 7 8. Rook testified that he used this road 
several times to access the Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc. parcel. Affidavit of John Rook 
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 3, 7 4. 
Apparent continuous use from no later than 1975 is also shown by the Affidavit 
of Wynn Wenker. Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment filed March 9, 2004, Exhibit FF at 710. The Farmanian - Mack Agreement 
and Quit Claim Deed attached also infers that there is a road across the Section 21 
property, the Farmanian property at that time. Id. Exhibit EE. Harold Funk's Affidavit 
indicates that the road subject to this action is the only road onto the property. Affidavit 
of Harold Funk in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 2, 77 3, 4. Harold 
Funk further indicates that it was their intent to include an easement in the transfer to 
Human Synergistics so the property in Section 22 would not be landlocked. Id. 7 6. 
Similarly, John Rook's Affidavit states that when Kootenai Broadcasing purchased from 
the Funks (at a later time in 1989), this road that is subject of this dispute was the only 
access to the property now held by Capstar. Affidavit of John Rook in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment, 7 6. 
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Capstar noticed thherr Motion far Summary Judgment to be heard on April 14. 
2004 Just prior to that hearing, Lawrences pro se made discovery motions related to 
rnformatron Rook and  Funk had. Because such discovery was not relevant to the 
express easement theory, discovery was allowed and Capstar's motion for summary 
judgment proceeded on the express easement theory alone. The ldaho Supreme Court 
has ruled on that issue. On March 23, 2004, Lawrences pro se filed Defendants 
Lawrences Reply in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. In that 
pleading Lawrences claim, with a reference to a Metzker Map, that Capstar has access 
to its parcel via Mellick Road. Defendants Lawrences' Reply in Opposition to Plaitiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 5. On April 6, 2004, Capstar filed an Affidavit of 
Kelvin Brownsberger, the Road Supervisor for Post Falls Highway District. He testified 
in his affidavit that Post Falls Highway District has not constructed and maintained 
Mellick Road beyond its entry into Section 15, well short of Section 21 or Section 22. 
Even if Lawrences had created an issue of fact as to an alternate route (they have not), 
the ldaho Supreme Court in Davis v. Peacock, 133 ldaho 637, 642, 991 P.2d 362, 367 
(1999) held only "reasonable necessity" is needed for an easement by implication, not 
strict necessity which is needed in an implied easement by necessity. 
Lawrences made one other argument in Lawrences' Reply in Opposition to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 16-1 7. Lawrences claim Wilber Mead 
testified he kept his gate locked from1966 until 1998, that the only party that had a key 
to the gate was General Telephone Company, that Mead granted Funks an easement 
in 1972 and that Funks moved to American Falls in 1975; thus, Funks could have only 
used the property for three years instead of the requisite five. Id. Lawrences cite to the 
Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in Support of Defendants Lawrences' Reply in 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit H, but no such 564 
documen"rxrsts Only the cover page of Douglas Lawrence's Affldavlt IS filed 
Capstar argues that Mead only stated "to his knowledge" Mr Funk was not using 
the road that Mead rndrcates he gave a key to GTE, but Mead has no knowledge as to 
whether GTE gave a copy of the key to Funk or any knowledge that Funk did not go 
around the gate Capstar also argues there is no evidence to support Lawrences's 
allegation that Funks moved to American Falls in 1975 Plaintiff's Reply Brief in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 4. 
In Capstar's Memorandum in Support of Renewed Motion for Summary 
Judgment filed May 14, 2007, Capstar reiterates the same facts, law and arguments it 
made in 2004. Lawrences, through their attorney, filed their "Opposition of Douglas and 
Brenda Lawrence to Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff' on July 24, 2007. In 
that brief, Lawrences essentially argue that since Funks had no right to cross Section 
28 (Section 28 lies immediately to the south of Section 22 in which Lawrences' parcel is 
contained and Blossom Mountain Road dips from Section 22, down to Section 28, 
before reaching Section 21), they have no right to cross Blossom Mountain Road as it 
crosses Lawrences' land. Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion for 
Summary Judgment of Plaintiff, pp. 4-5. Capstar correctly notes that in this lawsuit the 
owner of Section 28 is not a party. Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Summary Judgment, p. 7. Capstar's access, or lack thereof, over the portion of 
Blossom Mountain Road as it travels through Section 28 is simply not an issue before 
this Court. Finally, Lawrences again argue Capstar and their predecessor Funk had the 
ability to access their land via Mellick Road. Opposition of Douglas and Brenda 
Lawrence to Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff, p. 6. On August 2, 2007, 
Capstar filed "Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment". Capstar correctly points out that nothing in Bruce Anderson's Affidavit 
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(Attached as Exhibit D to the Affidavrt of Do~lglas Lawrence filed July 24, 2007), nothing 
in the Viewer's Report and nothing in Loudin v Sfokes (a 1987 District Court decision 
by District Judge Gary M Haman whrch shows it was related to Section 15 and Mellick 
Road, Exhibit C to Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in Support of Opposition to Summary 
Judgment filed July 24, 2007), demonstrate that Funks could access their Section 22 
property from Mellick Road because the Funks never owned the Northeast Quarter of 
Section 21 Plaintrff's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment, p. 3. 
After Capstar filed its reply brief on summary judgment, on September 10, 2007, 
Lawrences filed yet another brief on summary judgment (in contravention of I.R.C.P. 
56(c)), this one entitled "Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion for 
Summary Judgment of Plaintiff'. In that brief, Lawrences repeat, word for word the brief 
Lawrences filed on July 24, 2007, as it pertains to implied easements from prior use. 
No request for a jury trial has ever been made in Capstar v. Lawrence. 
Accordingly, "When an action will be tried before the court without a jury, the trial court 
as the trier of fact is entitled to arrive at the most probable inferences based upon the 
undisputed evidence properly before it and grant the summary judgment despite the 
possibility of conflicting inferences. Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, L.L.C., 140 Idaho 
354, 360-61, 93 P.3d 685, 691-92 (2004). 
In the Capstar case, there is unity of title at the time of the severance of the 
dominant and servient estate. The road was in use by the Funks at the time of the 
severance and served as their sole access to the Section 21 and Section 22 properties 
they retained. Thus, it was reasonably necessary for the beneficial use of the dominant 
estate, Funk's Section 22 property at the time of severance. Capstar has met its 
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burden of proving there is an implied easement by prior use which is appurtenant to the 
property. 
C. Easernent by Necessity. 
Capstar correctly notes that an easement by necessity has some similar 
elements to an easement by prior use. Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment, p. 13. The elements are: (1) that the dominant parcel and the 
servient parcel were once part of a larger tract under common ownership; (2) that the 
necessity for the easement claimed over the servient estate existed at the time of the 
severance; and (3) the present necessity for the claimed easement is great. Id., cifing 
B&J Development & Inv. Inc. v. Parsons, 126 ldaho 504, 507, 887 P.2d 49, 52 (Ct.App. 
1994), MacCaskill v. Ebbed, 112 ldaho 1 115, 11 18, 739 P.2d 414, 417 (Ct.App. 1987); 
Bob Daniels & Sons v. Weaver, 106 ldaho 535, 543, 681 P.2d 1010, 101 8 (Ct.App 
1984). See also, Bear Island WaferAssfn, Inc. v. Brown, 125 ldaho 71 7, 725, 874 P.2d 
528, 536 (1994). Capstar added little in its Memorandum in Support of Renewed 
Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 13. 
There is no dispute that the first element exists. 
As to the second and third elements, Lawrences pro se made an argument 
unsupported by the law, that because "Funks and [Capstar] don't have a legal 
easement to get to the Lawrence property to cross it", necessity does not exist. 
Defendants Lawrences Reply in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
p. 18. This argument was noted by the Court in its analysis of an implied easement 
from prior use. Since the owner of Section 28 is not a party to this lawsuit, Lawrences' 
argument is without merit. 
Capstar claims that Kelvin Brownsberger's affidavit contradicts Lawrences' claim 
that there is access via Mellick Road based upon a Metsker's map. Plaintiff's Reply 
Brlef in Suppofl of Motion for Summary Judgment, p 5 Because Brownsberger does 
nottell us in his affidav~t when he became familiar with Mellick Road, nor does he tell us 
when he began working for the Post Falls Highway District Brownsberger cannot 
discuss what existed back in 1969 when Funk's purchased or what existed back in 
1975 when Funks sold to Human Synergistics (Lawrences' predecessor). What is 
pertinent is what existed at severance in 1975. The Metsker's map (at the August 7, 
2007 hearing on motions to strike, this Court took judicial notice that Metsker maps 
have been relied upon for decades, but not as to their accuracy) is not sufficient to 
contradict Howard Funk's testimony. The only competent evidence of what existed in 
1975 is from Howard Funk. Funk stated: "The private easement road was the only 
existing road providing access to the Southeast Quarter of Section 21 and the 
Southwest Quarter of Section 22" and when they severed the property in 1975 the sales 
agreement referenced that private road and that the Section 21 property being sold to 
Human Synergistics, Inc., was being sold subject to an ingress egress easement over 
the existing road, and that it was not their intent to landlock the Section 22 property. 
Affidavit of Harold Funk in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 3, f[f[ 4, 6. 
John Rook corroborates Harold Funk, but does so at a later time in I989  when 
Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc. purchased its land. Rook testified in his affidavit that in 
1989 the private access road was the only road that provided access to the Funks' 
parcels in the Southwest Quarter of Section 22. Affidavit of John Rook in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 3, f[f[ 4, 6. Finally, John Mack's affidavit makes it 
clear that Mellick Road did not provide access to the Funks' parcels in 1992 when Mack 
purchased. Affidavit of John Mack in Support of Defendants Lawrences Reply in 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 23, 2004. 568 
Lawrences then make the argument that: "Funk obviously had access to his 
other lands when he severed the parcel sold to Hyrnan Synerglstlcs in 1975, otherwise 
Funk would have taken great care to reserve an easement across the parcel he sold to 
Human Synergistics in 1975." Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion 
for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff, p. 7. The identical argument is made in Opposition 
of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff, pp. 10- 
11. This argument by Lawrences actually cuts against Lawrences quite clearly when 
one considers the uncontradicted fact that Funks in their Sale Agreement to Human 
Synergistics, Inc., stated that "the Section 21 parcel being sold was subject to an 
ingress egress easement over the existing road ori the property that was being sold to 
Human Synergistics (Affidavit of Harold Funk in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment, p. 3, f[ 6). Just as the Lawrences argue, Funks actually did take great care 
to reserve an easement across the parcel he sold to Human Synergistics in 1975; 
however, they errantly put that language in the Sale Agreement. That is why there is no 
express easement. But the reason there is no express easement is perhaps the most 
convincing evidence as to the implied easement theories.. . Funks needed to, intended 
to, and thought they did reserve an easement across the Human Synergistics land (now 
Lawrences land) when they sold to Human Synergistics in 1975. At all times thereafter 
Funks used this road as if they had every right in the world to use it. This Court finds 
that the second element of easement by necessity exists ... the necessity for the 
easement claimed over the servient estate existed at the time of the severance in 1975. 
Capstar argues that the third element, present great necessity for the easement, 
is supported by the Affidavit of Thomas Mack. Mack's affidavit does indicate Mellick 
Road does not pass over Funks' property, and Mack's affidavit indicates that even 
Mack had no access to Mellick Road until he made an agreement with Fred Zuber, who 
owned to the North of Mack, "whereby I agreed to reconstruct the road leading down 
the north face of Blossom Mountain " Mack also testtfied "Over the years, the road had 
been completely abandoned" and "It did not appear that anyone had used the road for 
nearly 20 years " Capstar also argues "As demonstrated on the assessor's map 
included as Exhibit 'A' to Weeks' Affidavit in Support of Motion to Strike Lawrence 
Affidavit filed 7124107, Mellick Road as constructed today lies in the Northeast Quarter 
and the Southeast Quarter of Section 22", and "Funks never owned either of these 
parcels " Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, 
p. 13; Affidavit of Weeks in Support of Motion to Strike Lawrence Testimony, filed 
August 4, 2007, Exhibit A. 
This Court finds there is no question of fact as to whether the present necessity 
for the claimed easement is great. There is no evidence that Capstar has any other 
access other than the Blossom Mountain Road access which is the subject of this 
litigation. 
D. Easement by Prescription. 
An easement by prescription was not raised in Capstar's initial Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment filed March 9, 2004, nor did Lawrences 
discuss the theory in their pro se Defendants Lawrences Reply in Opposition to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 23, 2004. Capstar did not raise 
the theory in its Reply Brief in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment filed 
April 6, 2004. The first time the issue of a prescriptive easement was raised was in 
Capstar's Memorandum in Support of Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 11- 
12. 
Capstar argues the road was established as early as 1966, and that it is 
undisputed that Funks were using the road for access to both their Section 21 and 
Section 22 parcels. Id. p. 12. Capstar argues that when Funks sold the Section 21 
parcel to Human Synergistics (Lawrences' predecessor), Funks included rn the sales 
contract language that gave notice that Funks intended to continue to use the road for 
ingress and egress to the Section 22 parcel Funks retained. Id. Capstar argues this 
language provided notice to others that they were claiming a right to use the road in the 
future for ingress and egress to the lands the Funks retained, and that it is undisputed 
that Funks and their predecessors (successors) then proceeded to use the road openly, 
continuously, without interruption, under a claim of right for the statutory period. Id. 
Capstar notes the ldaho Supreme Court in Akers v. D. L. White Construction, 
Inc., 142 ldaho 293, 303, 127 P.3d 196, 206 (2005) held: 
A party seeking to establish the existence of an easement by 
prescription "must prove by clear and convincing evidence use of the 
subject property, which is characterized as: 1) open and notorious; (2) 
continuous and uninterrupted; (3) adverse and under a claim of right; (4) 
with the actual or imputed knowledge of the owner of the servient 
tenement (5) for the statutory period." (citation omitted). The statutory 
period in question is five years. (citations omitted). A claimant may rely 
on his own use, or he "may rely on the adverse use by the claimant's 
predecessor for the prescriptive period, or the claimant may combine such 
predecessor's use with the claimant's own use to establish the requisite 
five continuous years of use." (citation omitted). Once the claimant 
presents proof of open, notorious, continuous, uninterrupted use of the 
claimed right for the prescriptive period, even without evidence of how the 
use began, he raises the presumption that the use was adverse and 
under a claim of right. (citations omitted). The burden then shifts to the 
owner of the servient tenement to show that the claimant's use was 
permissive, or by virtue of a license, contract, or agreement. (citations 
omitted). 
Memorandum in Support of Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 11-12. 
A prescriptive right cannot be granted if the use of the servient tenement was by 
permission of its owner, because the use, by definition, was not adverse to the rights of 
the owner. Hughes v. Fisher, 142 ldaho 474, 480, 129 P.3d 1223, 1229 (2006). 
Lawrences argue that Capstar's use of the land has always been permissive. 
Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion for Summary Judgment of 5 7 1 
Plaint~ff, p 5 ,  n 5 Footnote five of Lawrences' brref cites the Court to the "affidavrts of 
Daniel Rebor [sic, actually Rebeor] and Douglas Lawrence" to support this claim There 
are several Douglas Lawrence affidavits filed in this matter. The Affidavit of Douglas 
Lawrence in Support of Opposition to Summary Judgment filed July 24, 2007, indicates 
just the opposite, that Capstar's use of the land at least when Lawrences came into 
possession of the land, was anything but permissive: 
25. Since taking title to the land, I have worked hard to protect my 
private property rights from illegal trespass. I have maintained one or 
more locks on my gate, placed no trespass signs at various points on the 
property, stopped and turned back people who cannot demonstrate a 
legal right to use the road, and have actively attempted to engage the 
local Sheriffs office on many occasions to get their support. Between 
May 2000, and October 2003, 1 have filed over I 0  separate crime reports 
with the Kootenai County Sheriffs office for vandalism, trespass, 
destruction of personal property, and for leaving my gate open and 
unlocked. These Crime Reports are attached and included herein as 
Exhibit "I" .  
Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in Support of Opposition to Summary Judgment, filed 
July 24, 2007, p. 9 (unnumbered pages), fl 25.  Douglas Lawrence's affidavit 
contradicts the claim his attorney makes on his behalf. Lawrences' claim that use of 
the land has always been permissive flies in the face of the fact that the genesis of this 
lawsuit was Lawrences "periodically locked the gate which they placed across the 
Blossom Mountain Road in an effort to deny Capstar its right of access over and across 
the Blossom Mountain Road." Complaint for Quiet Title and Permanent Injunction, p. 6, 
fl XVlV (XIX). 
Douglas Lawrence's affidavit claims that prior to 2001, "Capstar's use of the road 
as it crosses my land was permissive." Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in Support of 
Opposition to Summary Judgment, filed July 24, 2007, p. 14 (unnumbered pages), fl 
49, Exhibit M. Douglas Lawrence cites to Capstar's response to Lawrences' Request 
for Admission No. 85 which reads: "Please admit that, prior to 2001, Defendants 5 77: 
Lawrence drd not use any gate to restrict PlaintiN Capstar's Vehicular access", to whrch 
Capstar responded "Adrnrt that the gate has always been on the road since Capstar's 
predecessors in title acquired the Capstar parcel was not locked and did not obstruct 
erther Capstar or its predecessors in title's access until it was locked by Lawrence." Id. 
The fact that the gate is not locked may be evidence of Lawrences' acquiescence of 
others, including Capstar, to travel thrs road, it may be evidence of Lawrences' 
indifference of others, including Capstar, travelling this road, and it may be evidence of 
Lawrences' ignorance of anyone, including Capstar travelling this road, but it is not 
evidence that Lawrences or their predecessors gave Capstar or its predecessors 
permission to use this road. "Mere inaction and passive acquiescence is not a sufficient 
basis for proving that the use of the claimed right was with the permission of the owner of 
the servient tenement." West v. Smith, 95 Idaho 550, 557, 51 1 P.2d 1326, 1333 (1 973). 
Lawrences claim that "Capstar's use of the land has always been permissive" 
ignores the fact that Lawrences did not purchase their property until 1996. Thus, in the 
years from 1966 to 1996, they are not competent to testify as to anything that occurred 
in that period. 
Lawrences cite the affidavit of Daniel Rebor [Rebeor] for their claim that 
Capstar's use of the road was permissive. Opposition of Douglas and Brenda 
Lawrence to Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff, p. 9, n. 5. There is an Affidavit 
of Daniel E. Rebeor in Support of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order filed July 22, 
2003. A review of Rebeor's affidavit shows he managed the tower site for Capstar, and 
that "On November 3, 1997, Nextel West Corp. entered into an "Access License 
Agreement" with Douglas and Brenda Lawrence in an effort to avoid litigation regarding 
access to a leased parcel upon which it was locating a communications tower ..." 
Affidavit of Daniel E. Rebeor, p 2, nn 2, 3. On January 13, 2003, Nextel assigned the 5 7.5 
- -. 
Access License Agreement to Capstar Id 4 The uncon"iroverted evidence is the 
license was entered into in 1997 "in an effort to avoid litigation" That certainly is not 
evidence that there was permissive use of the road at that time. It is evidence of just 
the opposite, that Lawrences were claiming Capstar had no right to use the road. 
Certainly the assignment of a license would stop the adverse period from running per 
the quoted portion of Akers, but the evidence has not been contradicted by Lawrences 
that from 1966 to 2003 Capstar and their predecessors used this road under a claim of 
right, 
Capstar's uncontradicted evidence is as fol'lows: Harold Funk testified in his 
affidavit that: "Following the sale [in 19751, we continuously utilized the existing road in 
Section 21 to access our property in Section 22 without interference." Affidavit of 
Harold Funk in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 9, 2004, p. 4, fl 
6 .  John Rook testified in his affidavit that when Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc, purchased 
its parcel in 1989: 
There were other nearby parcels used for towers further east from 
the parcel purchased by Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc., including a parcel of 
property owned and used by General Telephone Company. At the time 
that Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc, purchased its parcels, these property 
owners and their tenants were using the road to access their parcels, and 
continued to do so after Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc. purchased its parcel. 
Affidavit of John Rook in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 9, 
The existing private access road was visible and in use by Funks at 
the time Kootenai Broadcasting purchased its parcel. I have personally 
driven this road and used it on several occasions to access the Kootenai 
Broadcasting, Inc. parcel. The private road was the only road that 
provided access to Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc.'s parcel of property. 
Lawrences make several arguments regarding Capstar's predecessor's (the 
f i n k s )  ablllty to obtain a prescriptive easement First, Lawrences claim "In 1975. Funk 
moved to Aberdeen and then to American Falls, Idaho, where he has resided since 
(Funk Deposition, hereinafter 'FD' 28:20 to 28:24.). Opposition of Douglas and Brenda 
Lawrence to Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 4. Lawrences then argue: 
"After moving to American Falls, Funk visited his land on Blossom Mountain only two or 
three times (FD 30:25 to 31:4)" and "Funk has not visited the Blossom Mountain land 
since 1981 (FD 31:17)." Id., p. 5. What Lawrences omit from that same deposition is 
the following: 
Q. BY MR. WHELAN: Now between the time you bought the property 
and the time you sold it to Human Synergistics, how many times did you 
go up to the property? 
A. Well, we'd always go up andpick huckleberries and stuff, and target 
practice and - I don't know. I would have to guess maybe, I don't know, 
20, 30 times. 
Q. In the two year period, well three years since 1969. I'm sorry. Six- 
year period, from 1969 until 1975, about 30 times you were on top of the 
mountain? 
A. I would suppose, yeah. 
Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Renewed Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Exhibit A (August 17, 2007 Deposition of Harold Funk), p. 25, LI. 11-23. 
Lawrences fail to realize that Funk's use of his property and the use he made of the 
Lawrence property in getting to his property from 1975 to the present is not relevant. 
The uncontradicted evidence is that Funk used the property consistently for the six- 
year period from the day he sold to Human Synergistics to the day he moved from the 
area. This is one year more than the five years required for the prescriptive use. 
This isn't the type of property of which one would expect daily use. The property is on 
top of a mountain. Capstar seeks this easement to maintain its radio equipment on top 
of this mountain. The use Capstar seeks is no different than the prescriptive use Funks 
made of Lawrences' land for that six-year period from 1 969 to 1 975. 
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E. Lawrences' New Defenses o f  Laches and Statute of Limitations. 
On September 10, 2007, Lawrences filed therr Motion for Leave to File Amended 
Answer, requesting to add the addit~onal defense of laches This motion to amend was 
granted and an order to that eflect was filed on September 26, 2007. Also on 
September 10, 2007, Lawrences filed another brief on summary judgment, this one 
entitled "Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion for Summary Judgment 
of Plaintif'. In that brief, Lawrences repeat their arguments made in their brief filed July 
24, 2007, regarding implied easement by prior use, easement by necessity and 
easement by prescription. Lawrences claim additional facts not in dispute. Finally, 
Lawrences also added a brief argument on Statute of Limitations and a one paragraph 
argument regarding laches. Lawrences also filed on September 10, 2007, an "Affidavit 
of Douglas Lawrence in Support of Opposition to Renewed Motion for Summary 
Judgment" and an "Affidavit of John P. Whelan in Support of Defendants' Opposition to 
Plaintiff's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of Defendants' 
Motion for Leave to Amend." On September 17, 2007, Capstar filed "Plaintiff's 
Supplemental Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment". 
I) Statute of Limitations. 
Lawrences argue ldaho Code Ej 5-203 and 5-204 apply to bar Capstar's claims. 
Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion for Summary Judgment of 
Plaintiff, p. 6. Lawrences provide no legal analysis to support that argument. ldaho 
Code Ej 5-203 is not a statue of limitation. It simply sets forth the number of years a 
plaintiff in an action must be in possession of the property in question before filing a 
lawsuit to adverse possess that property, ldaho Code Ej 5-204 is also not a statute of 
limitation, but, simply a statute setting forth the number of years a party must be seized 
or be in possession of property following an act of adverse use. It applies to all parties, 
not just the plaintiff as in I C 5 5-203, and it applies to defenses and to prescriptive 
easements, where I C 5 5-203 only concerns prescriptive possession of property 
Lawrences argue "Plaintiffs complarnt makes no reference to its predecessors 
interest" Id First, Lawrences completely fail to explaln the legal significance of that 
claim There can be no legal basis for thls argument, as both I C § 5-203 and 3 5-204 
specifically mention a party's predecessor ldaho case law has long since recognized 
this fact that a party's predecessor's use of property or time in possession can be 
tacked on to the party's use or time in possession to achieve the requisite number of 
years. Akers v. D. L. White Construcfion, lnc , 142 ldaho 293, 303, 127 P.3d 196, 206 
(2005), Hodgins v Sales, 139 ldaho 225, 230, 76 P 3d 969, 975 (2003); State ex re/. 
Harnan v. Fox, 100 ldaho 140, 146, 594 P 2d 1093, 1099 (1 979); Marshall v. Blair, 130 
ldaho 675, 680, 946 P.2d 975, 980 (1997). Second, from a factual standpoint, 
Lawrences' claim is false. Capstar's Complaint, p. 6, 7 XVll alleges: "Capstar and its 
predecessors in title have used the Blossom Mountain Road as it crosses the 
Defendants' real property for access to Capstar's real property openly, notoriously, 
continuously, adversely and under claim of right for a period exceeding five (5) years." 
Lawrences next argue: "Any such rights would necessarily had to have been litigated to 
be perfected." Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion for Summary 
Judgment of Plaintiff, p. 7. Again, there is no explanation as to the legal basis of this 
claim Such argument is squarely contradicted by ldaho Code 3 5-203, 5 5-204, and 
the analysis of Hodgins, Harnan, Marshall and Akers. 
2) Laches. 
Lawrences entire argument on laches is as follows: 
Whether or not a party is guilty of laches is ordinarily a question of 
fact. Osterlich v.Stafe of Idaho, 100 ldaho 702, 604 P.2d 716. It is 
beyond y uestlon that the Lawrences have been prejudiced by the alleged 
stale claims which PlaintrfT now seeks to enforce If Plaintiff and its 
predecessors truly enjoyed easements by implication, necessity andlor by 
prescriptive use, those claims should have been perfected through 
litigation. The failure to pursue the claims by Plaintiff's predecessors has 
clearly prejudiced the ability of the Lawrences and their predecessors to 
defend against the claims 
Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion for Summary Judgment of 
Plaintiff, p. 7. (italics in original). While Lawrences claim it is "beyond question" that 
Lawrences have been prejudiced, there is not one fact alleged, not one bit of argument 
stating why this is so. Similarly, there is no factual or legal argument made why 
Capstar's claims or Capstar's predecessor's "claims should have been perfected 
through litigation." The obvious flaw to Lawrences' unsupported argument is prior to 
Lawrences purchasing their property and subsequently denying Capstar access, there 
was no need to litigate! Every indication is that as soon as Lawrences prohibited 
Capstar's access, Capstar took action. Capstar simply is not "guilty of laches." 
There is absolutely no merit to either of Lawrences' defenses of statute of 
limitations or laches 
It. ANALYSIS REGARDING TOWER ASSET SUB, INC. v. LAWRENCE. 
A. Facts Pertaining to Tower Asset Sub, Inc., v. Lawrence. 
As a preliminary matter, on November 13, 2007, Tower Asset filed a "Motion for 
Substitution of Real Party in Interest." The basis for this motion is Tower Asset Sub, 
Inc. became Tower Asset Sub, L.L.C., and on February 23,2007, Tower Asset Sub, 
L.L.C. merged into Spectra Site, L.L.C., a different Deleware Corporation. Affidavit of 
Raymond W. Goodwin in Support of Substitution of Real Party in Interest. This motion 
was heard on November 28, 2007, just prior to oral argument on Capstar's summary 
judgment motion. At the end of oral argument on the Motion for Substitution of Real 
Party in interest, the Court granted the motion and directed counsel for Tower Asset to 5'75 
prepare an order No order has been prepared to date S~nce no order has been 
entered unt~l th~s dec~s~on a d order, the Court will cont~nue to refer to the plaint~ff In this 
act~on as Tower Asset Sub, inc , (Tower Asset) even though the Court has granted the 
rnot~on to substitute Spectra Site, L.L.C., as the real party In interest. 
Tower Asset has made ~t clear that ~t IS only seeking ~njunctive relief in this case, 
and that Tower Asset is not making any claim to title over Lawrences' land. Plaintiff's 
Supplemental Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 1. 
Blossom Mountain is located south of Post Falls, Idaho The Lawrences and the 
Halls (through whom Tower Asset claims its right) own parcels of property on Blossom 
Mountain. Both the Halls' parcel and the Lawrences' parcel (Lawrence parcel) were 
once part of a larger tract held under common ownership by Harold and Marlene Funk. 
The Lawrence parcel was broken out in 1975 when Funks sold that parcel to Human 
Synergistics. Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
(Tower Asset Case filed August 17, 2004), p. 2, 7 2.e., Exhibit E. The Halls' parcel was 
broken out in 1996 when Funks sold a parcel to Rasmussen. Id., Exhibit Q. The 
Lawrence parcel is located in the southeast quarter of Section 21, and the Halls' parcel 
is located to the east in the southwest quarter of Section 22. Id. Section 21 lies directly 
west of Section 22. Id., p. 6, 7 8, Exhibit Z. There is a public road in the area known 
as Signal Point Road. Signal Point Road lies generally West of the Lawrence parcel, 
which in turn is west of Hall's parcel. Tower Asset, as a tenant of Halls, seeks an 
easement to access its equipment located on Halls' property which Tower Asset leases 
from the Halls. The easement is located on an unimproved private road commonly 
known as Blossom Mountain Road as Blossom Mountain Road crosses through the 
Lawrence parcel. In litigation in yet another case, Douglas Lawrence, in his deposition 
taken September 30, 2003, recognized the right-of-way easement General Telephone 
Corporation (GTC) obtained in July 1966 for access to GTC s property in Sectlon 22 
over the prlvate road that crossed the Southwest Quarter of Section 21 (Lawrences' 
parcel) Id ,  pp. 6-7, TfT 5-7, Exhibit W, X and Y. The detail of the access road 
prepared by GTC's engineer in 1967 shows the road leaves Signal Point Road, then 
travels southeast through the southwest portion of Section 21 (Lawrences' parcel), then 
enters the North Half of Section 28 where it then turned northeast and entered the 
southeast quarter of Section 21. Id. Exhibit Y, and Exhibit 15 attached to Exhibit Y. 
Tower Asset asserts that prior to the separation by the Funks of the Lawrences' parcel 
from the parent parcel, the private road across the Section 21 parcel had been used by 
the Funks as the exclusive means to access their property in Sections 21 and 22. 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (field August 17, 2004), pp. 
4-5, 11 7-9. Tower Asset asserts that even after the separation of Section 21, the 
Funks continued to use the private easement road to access their Section 22 parcel. 
Id., pp. 5-6, 17 10-1 1. 
Capstar and Tower Asset prove the following chain of title for the parcels 
involved in Sections 21 and 22: 
1. Reynolds to the Radens and the Marcos (Contract in 1968, Deed in 1974): 
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset 
case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits A and D. 
2. Radens and Marcos to Funk (Contract in 1969, Deed in 1974): Affidavit of 
Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset case filed 
August 17, 2004), Exhibits B and C. 
To this point there was unity of title in the portions of Sections 21 and 22 at issue in this 
case. 
Capstar and Tower Asset establish the title chain with respect to what became 581 
the Lawrence property located In the southeast quarter of Section 21 as. 
1 Funk to Human Synerglstics (Sale Agreement In 1975, Deed in 1992): 
Supplemental Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment (Tower Asset case filed November 2, 2004), E and I; Affidavit of 
Susan Weeks in Support of Motlon for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset 
case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits A and F; Affidavit of Susan Weeks in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9, 
2004), Exhibit A and F. 
2. Human Synergistics to Johnston & McHugh (Contract and Deed May 16, 
1977): Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment (Tower Asset case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits F and H; 
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
(Capstar case filed March 9, 2004), Exhibits F and H. 
3. Johnston & McHugh to N.A.P. (Sale Agreement October 6, 1987, Deed July 
16, 1996): Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment (Tower Asset case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits G and 0 ;  
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
(Capstar case filed March 9, 2004), Exhibits G and 0. 
4. N.A.P. to Farmanian (Deeds June 28, 1996 and July 8, 1996)): Affidavit of 
Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset 
case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits J and K; Affidavit of Susan Weeks in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9, 
2004), Exhibits J and K. 
5 Farmanian to Douglas and Brenda Lawrence (Sale Agreement July 12, 
1996, Deed July 5, 1996). ARidav~t of Susan Weeks In Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment (Tower Asset case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits L, 
M, N and P; Affidavit of Susan Weeks In Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment (Capstar case fifed March 9, 2004), Exh~b~ts L, M, N and P. 
Capstar establ~shes the title chain with respect to what became the Capstar property in 
the southwest corner of Section 22 as: 
1. Funk to Kootenai Broadcasting (Deed September 22, 1989): Affidavit of 
Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case 
filed March 9, 2004), Exhibit Exhibits Q and R. 
2. Kootenai Broadcasting to Rook Broadcasting (Deed October 25, 1993): 
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
(Capstar case filed March 9, 2004) Exhibit S. 
3. Rook Broadcasting to AGM (Deed November 20, 1998): Affidavit of Susan 
Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed 
March 9, 2004), Exhibit T. 
4. AGM to Capstar (Deed October 25, 2000): Affidavit of Susan Weeks in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9, 
2004), Exhibit U. 
Tower Asset establishes the title chain with respect to what became the Hall property in 
the southwest corner of Section 22 as: 
1. Funk to Rasmussen (Deed August 26, 1996),: Affidavit of Susan Weeks in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset case filed August 
17, 2004), Exhibit Q. 5 E 
2 Rasmussen to VanSky (Deed September 29, 1978) Aff~dav~t of Susan 
Weeks In Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset case 
filed August 17, 2004), Exhibit R 
3. VanSky to Switzer Communications. Inc. (Deed December 11, 1981): 
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
(Tower Asset case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibit S. 
4. Switzer Communications, Inc. to Term Corp. (Deed December 8, 1982): 
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
(Tower Asset case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibit T. 
5. Term Corp. to Mark E. Hall and Robert A. Hall (Deed April 16, 1997); 
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
(Tower Asset case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibit U. 
6. Spectra Site was assigned a leasehold interest with Mark Hall and Robert 
Hall in a Parcel of property situated in the Southwest quarter of Section 
22, Township 50 North, Range 5 West, Boise Mer4idian, Kootenai 
County, Idaho. Affidavit of Dan Rebeor (Tower Asset case filed July 22, 
2003). 
When the Lawrences questioned Tower Asset's right to access the property it 
leases from the Halls over the portion of Blossom Mountain Road that traversed 
Lawrences', Tower Asset filed suit on June 27, 2003, seeking declaratory and injunctive 
relief. Tower Asset sought to have an easement declared based on four theories: 
express easement, easement by implication, easement by necessity, and prescriptive 
easement. On Tower Asset's previous motion for summary judgment, this court found 
that Tower Asset held an express easement over the Lawrence property based on the 
sale agreement, as well as the deed. Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment 584 
and Enter~ng Decree of Qu~et Title f~led May 27, 2005 The Court did not address 
Tower Asset's other theortes rarsed In lbs Complaint due to a drscovery issue at the 
tlrne Accordingly, Tower Asset and Lawrences in that rnitial motion for summary 
judgment did not address theor~es of easement by ~mplicatlon, easement by necessity 
and prescr~ptlve easement. The Lawrences appealed from that decision, and the 
Supreme Court reversed summary judgment holding the deed did not create an 
express easement over the Lawrence property. On remand, Tower Asset renews its 
motion for summary judgment based on the other theories of easement previously 
rased In their complaint. 
The Lawrence parcel and the Hall parcel were once part of a single tract of land 
under the common ownership of Harold and Marlene Funk. In 1975, the Funks divided 
their land and sold what is now the Lawrence parcel to Human Synergistics, Inc., while 
retaining the southwest quarter of Section 22. Tower Asset asserts that although its 
or~gins are unknown, it is apparent that an easement over the road existed as early as 
1966. In litigation in yet another case, Douglas Lawrence, in his deposition taken 
September 30, 2003, recognized the right of way easement General Telephone 
Corporation (GTC) obtained in July 1966 for access to GTC's property in Section 22 
over the private road that crossed the Southwest Quarter of Section 21 (Lawrences' 
parcel). Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 6- 
7, nn 5-7, Exhibit W, X and Y. The detail of the access road prepared by GTC's 
engineer in 1967 shows the road leaves Signal Point Road, then travels southeast 
through the Southwest portion of Section 21 (Lawrences' parcel), then enters the North 
Half of Section 28 were it then turned northeast and entered the Southeast quarter of 
Section 21. Id. Exhibit Y, and Exhibit 15 attached to Exhibit Y. 
Tower Asset claims that prior to the separation of the Lawrence parcel from the 
parent parcel, the private road across the Section 21 parcel had been used by the 
Funks as an exclusive means to access their property. That same road was later used 
by Hall for access to their segregated parcel in Section 22. Affidavit of Robert Hall in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 3, 11 7, 8. In 1992, the Funks executed 
and delivered a warranty deed conveying the Lawrence parcel to Human Synergistics. 
The warranty deed stated that the deed was given "in fulfillment of those certain 
contracts between the parties hereto dated July 1, 1975 and conditioned for the 
conveyance of the above described property." In 1996, after a number of other 
intermediate conveyances, the Lawrences acquired ownership of their parcel. 
The ldaho Supreme Court noted on appeal that Tower Asset had already 
established that the Halls (and thus, Tower Asset) were intended to have the right to 
use the easement. The ldaho Supreme Court noted in footnote 1 that: "Tower 
presented uncontroverted evidence that the Hall parcel was intended to have the 
benefit of the access road across the Lawrence parcel." Tower Assef Sub, Inc. v. 
Lawrence, 2007 Opinion No. 14, p. 4. 
Lawrences also claim Tower Asset has not established that it is Hall's tenant and 
that Tower Asset has no standing to seek to quiet title across Lawrences' land. 
Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion for Summary Judgment of 
Plaintiff, pp. 1, 2, 9, 10. A copy of the lease between Nextel Communications and Hall 
is included with the Affidavit of Robert Hall. Affidavit of Robert Hall in Support of Motion 
for Summary Judgment, p. 2, 77 3, 4, Exhibit A. Hall received notice that this lease was 
assigned to Tower Parent Corp., and Tower Asset Sub, Inc., and that Tower Asset Sub, 
Inc. continues to lease the site from us." Id. p. 2, 77 4, 5. Additionally, the Supreme 
Court in TowerAsset, Inc., v. Lawrence, supra, noted that: "We hold that Tower, as 
lessee of the alleged dominant estate, has standing to seek injunctive relief preventing 
b.,- ..-.,.. --,..,.,,... . ..- ---- - --. ..-...- - . . - - -  - - 
the Lawrence's from interfering with its right to sue "re easement.!' To~verrlsset Sub. 
Inc. v. Law[-ence, 2007 Opinion No. 14, p. 4. The ldaho Supreme Court also held: 
"Tower will have standing to seek injunctive relief if it can establish it has an alleged 
legal right to benefit from the Blossom Mountain Road easement." Id. Lawrences' 
argument that Tower Asset lacks standing to pursue easement theories of implication 
or necessity (Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Renewed Motion for 
Summary Judgment of Plaintiff, pp. 6-7) is without merit. Lawrences admit Tower Asset 
has standing to prove an easement by prescription. Id., p. 7. 
Lawrences qext argue that Wall has no easement by necessity or implication and 
thus has nothing to assign to Tower Asset, and that the only theory available to Tower 
Asset is easement by prescription. Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to 
Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff, pp. 1-3, 8. Tower Asset now argues that 
nothing presented by the Lawrences alters the Supreme Court holding that Tower Asset 
has standing as a lessee of the dominant estate. Tower Asset correctly .argues "the 
only issue remanded by the appellate court in this case was whether Tower 
Asset, as a tenant, has a legal right to benefit from the Blossom Mountain Road 
easement of its landlord, Halls." Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Summary Judgment, p. 2. (emphasis added). This is because the ldaho Supreme 
Court noted in Footnote 1 that: "Tower presented uncontroverted evidence that the Hall 
parcel was intended to have the benefit of the access road across the Lawrence 
parcel." TowerAsset Sub, Inc. v. Lawrence, 2007 Opinion No. 14, p. 4. 
In accordance with 28A C.J.S. Easements Ij 164 (1996), Tower Asset argues 
that while a private way may not be used by the general public, it may be used by the 
owner of the way, his family, tenants, servants, and guests, as well as by persons 
transacting business with hrm, rn the absence of a special agreement to the contrary 
Pla~nt~N's Reply Memorandum in Suppor"r of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 2. 
Additionally, Tower Asset asserts that there rs nothing contained in the copy of the 
lease between Tower Asset and Hall that demonstrates a special agreement between 
Hall and Tower Asset that Tower Asset may not use an easement for which the Halls 
have the benefit, Id. at p. 3. Hence, Tower Asset argues they are entitled to injunctive 
relief. id. 
Lawrences argue that Tower Asset is not t h e  Halls' tenant since the Halls and 
Tower Asset did not follow the assignment provision of the lease agreement. 
Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Renewed Motion for Summary 
Judgment, p. 10. The lease between Nextel and the Halls has a provision that reads: 
"Lessee may not assign, or otherwise transfer all or any part of its interest in this 
Agreement or in the Premises without the prior written consent of Lessors ...I1 Affidavit 
of Robert Hall in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit A, r( 14. Tower 
Asset re-characterizes Lawrences argument as  follows: "Essentially, Lawrences argue 
that Hall may not waive a contract clause." Plaintiffs' Supplemental Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 3. Tower Asset correctly 
states that as  long a s  the Halls and Tower Asset are in agreement that they share a 
tenant/landlord relationship pursuant to the lease, Lawrences may not challenge that 
relationship. Id. The uncontroverted evidence by Robert Hall is "...that Tower Asset 
Sub, Inc, continues to lease the site from us." Afidavit of Robert Hall in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 2, r(r(4, 5, Exhibit A. This Court finds the 
uncontroverted evidence shows that Hall and Tower Asset are in agreement that they 
share a landlord and tenant relationship. As noted by Tower Asset, "No law requires 
strict compliance to the terms of the lease agreement if the parties agree to the waiver 5 8 ~  
of t h e  term " Plaintiff's Supplemental Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment, p. 3. Obviously, Hall and Nextel either agreed to waive the 
assignment term or they simply are not concerned with that provision. There is no 
assignment issue at issue here Quite simply, the Lawrences are not in privity to the 
leasing agreement between Nextel and the Halls, or the agreement between Nextel's 
assignee, Tower Asset, and the Halls. Therefore, Tower Asset is correct in asserting its 
right to use the Halls' easement over Lawrences' land. Tower Asset is entitled to 
rnjunctive relief. 
As noted by the Idaho Supreme Court, "Tower presented uncontroverted 
evidence that the Hall parcel was intended to have the benefit of the access road 
across the Lawrence parcel." Tower Asset Sub, Inc. v. Lawrence, 2007 Opinion No. 
14, p. 4. Additionally, the analysis above as to Capstar's easement by implication from 
prior use, easement by necessity and easement by prescription, applies to the Halls. 
The only additional argument made by Lawrences as to an easement by prescription is 
that Lawrences argue that Tower Asset itself makes no claim that it has used the 
Lawrence parcel openly, notoriously, continuously, and in a hostile manner for the 
statutory period. Lawrences' argument continues that since no prescriptive claim has 
been established by Tower Asset and since Tower Asset's use of the road has always 
been permissive, a prescriptive easement cannot exist. The Court's analysis above 
explains why these arguments have no merit. The only additional argument made by 
Lawrences as to an implied easement by prior use is Lawrences assert that the parcel 
at issue in the Tower Asset case was not created or severed from the Funks' other 
lands until 1977 (as opposed to 1975 in the Capstar case) when Funk conveyed the 
property to Rasmussen/Chamberlain. Lawrences argue that because there was no 
easement in 1975 when the servient estate was severed from the dominant estate, and 
therefore no prior use Tower Asset has fa~led to meet t h e  second element af an 
implied easement This Court has already explained why there was an easement by 
~mplication, from prior use and by prescrrptron rn 1975 
As lessee from Halls, Tower Asset is entitled to ~njunctive relief against 
Lawrences as to use of this easement across Lawrences' land for use of this road 
known as Signal Point Road. 
Just as in the Capstar case, Lawrences in this Tower Asset case also make the 
arguments of statute of Itmitations and laches Opposition of Douglas and Brenda 
Lawrence to Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff, pp. 8-9. The analysis 
above as to those arguments applies in the Tower Asset case. Lawrences cannot avail 
themselves of those defenses for the reasons stated above. 
I l l .  ORDER. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment filed 
by Capsfar v. Lawrence, CV 2002 7671 and Renewed Motion for Summary Judmgnet 
filed in Tower Assef Sub, Inc. v. Lawrence, CV 2003 4621, are GRANTED. In the 
Capstar case, Capstar has proven they have an implied easement by prior use, an 
easement by necessity, and an easement by prescription, and Lawrences have failed to 
establish a material fact as to any other these theories. In the Capsfar case, 
Lawrences have failed to establish a material fact in dispute as to any of these theories. 
The defenses of laches and statute of limitations are not available to the Lawrences in 
the Capstar case. 
In the Tower Asset case, Tower Asset has proven they are entitled to injunctive 
relief, as their landlord, the Halls, have an easement over Lawrences land established 
by prior use, by necessity and by prescription, and Lawrences have failed to establish a 
material fact in d~spute as to any of these theories The defenses of laches and statute 
of l~mitatlons are not available to the Lawrences In the Tower Asset case 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED in the Tower Asset case, that Tower Asset's motion 
to substitute Spectra Site, L.L.C.. as the real party in interest is GRANTED. 
Entered this 6'h day of February, 2008. 
Certificate o f  Service 
I certify that on the day of February, 2008, a true copy of the foregoing was mailed 
postage prepaid or was sent by interoffice mail or facsrmile to each of the following: 
Lawyer  F a x  # 
John P. Whelan 208 664-2240 
JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C. 
2 1 3 N. 4th Street 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 8381 4 
Tele.: (208) 664-5891 
Fax: (208) 664-2240 
ISB# 6083 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING 
COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
CASE NO. CV-02-7671 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA 
J. LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
Defendants. I 
TO: The above-named Plaintiff, Capstar Radio Operating Company, and 
its attorney, Susan P. Weeks, and t o  the Clerk o f  the above-entitled Court: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named Defendants, Douglas P. Lawrence and Brenda J. 
Lawrence, appeal t o  the Idaho Supreme Court f rom orders entered in the above- 
entitled action by The Honorable John T. Mitchell presiding. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the ldaho Supreme Court, and 
the Orders described in paragraph one (1) above are appealable Orders under 
and pursuant to Rule 1 1 (a) of the ldaho Appellate Rules. 
3 .  Several primary orders are appealed in this appeal, including the 
February 6, 2008 order granting Plaintiff's renewed motion for summary 
judgment, together with the trial court order denying Defendants renewed 
motion for disqualification for cause. 
4. The primary issues presented by this appeal include, but are not 
limited to, the following: 
(a) Was it an abuse of discretion to permit Capstar to substitute 
Spectracite as the real party in interest? 
(b) Did the trial court abuse i t s  discretion by refusing to disqualify itself 
for cause? 
(c) In granting Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, are the 
findings of the trial court supported by substantial and competent 
evidence? 
(d) Did the trial court abuse i t s  discretion by granting Plaintiff 
prejudgment access to Defendants land without first requiring a 
bond or undertaking? 
(e) Did the trial court abuse its discretion in granting Defendants only 
two weeks to complete their discovery? 
(f) Did the trial court abuse i t s  discretion by admitting Plaintiff's 
affidavits in their entirety over Defendants' objections? 
(g) Did the trial court abuse i t s  discretion by excluding Defendants' 
affidavits? 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
5. (a) A reporter's transcript has been requested and the required 
fees will be paid on determination of an estimated cost. 
(b) The Defendants request the preparation of  any untranscribed 
transcripts of the hearings before the Court. 
6. The Defendants request that the Clerk's record include the 
documents specified in subsection (b)(l)  of Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules 
as well as the following documents: 
(a) Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and renewed motion for 
summary judgment all affidavits submitted in support of the motion. 
(b) Defendants' briefs in opposition to the various motions for summary 
judgment and all affidavits offered by Defendants in support o f  the opposition. 
(c) Defendants' renewed motion to disqualify for cause and all 
supporting briefs and affidavits. 
(d) Defendants' original motion to disqualify for cause and all 
supporting briefs and affidavits. 
(e) Defendants' motion for enlargement of time and the briefs and 
affidavits in support 
(f) Plaintiffs motion to substitute real party in interest, together with 
all briefs and affidavits in support. 
(g) Defendants' opposition to Plaintiff's motion to substitute real party 
in interest together with all briefs and affidavits in support. 
7 .  1 hereby certify: 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
(a) That a copy of  this Notice of Appeal has been served on the 
Clerk of the District Court. 
(b) That a request has been made with the Clerk of  the District 
Court for a determination of the estimated fee for the transcript cost. 
(c) Said fee will be paid upon determination o f  the appropriate 
amount. 
(d) Service has been made on all parties required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 20 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
DATED this ifdl day of March, 2008. 
JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C. 
A orn y for Defendants J f 3 w h e l a n  
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of March, 2008 1 caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of th going by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to the following: 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
Attorneys at Law 
1 626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4 
Via: /US. Mail, postage prepaid 
Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684 
Personally served 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
LAWRENCE, husband and 
Defendants-Appellants. 
The Notice of Appeal in the above captioned matter filed in this Court March 24, 
2008, requested that a Reporter's Transcript be prepared. However, the Notice of Appeal failed 
to comply with Idaho Appellate Rule 17 in that it did not specify by date and title the hearings 
required to be prepared for purposes of thls Appeal: therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellant shall file an AMENDED NOTICE OF 
APPEAL whlch complies with Idaho Appellate Rule 17, and shall specify by date and title the 
hearing(s) required to be prepared for purposes of this Appeal. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDER that Appellant shall serve the Reporter(s) with a copy 
of the Amended Notice of Appeal and shall indicate in the Amended Notice of Appeal whlch 
reporter(s) was served. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED the Amended Notice of Appeal shall be filed with 
the District Court within fourteen (14) days from the date of thls Order. In the event an 
Amended Notice of Appeal is not filed, this appeal may proceed on the Clerk's Record ONLY. 
DATED this 27th day of March 2008. 
cc. Counsel of Record 
In the Supreme Court of the Stat~~skt;M*q, 02 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING COMPANY, ) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
ORDER AUGMENTING APPEAL 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. ) 





A Reporter's Transcript and Clerk's Record was filed October 21, 2005 in appeal 
No. 32090, Capstar Radio Operating Company v. Lawrence, therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that the Appeal Record in this case shall be . 
AUGMENTED to include the Reporter's Transcript and Clerk's Record filed in prior appeal 
No. 32090. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the District Court Clerk shall prepare and file a 
LlMITED CLERK'S RECORD with this Court, which shall contain the documents requested in 
the Notice of Appeal, together with a copy of this Order, but shall not duplicate any document 
included in the Clerk's Record filed in prior appeal No. 32090. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the District Court Reporter shall prepare and 
lodge a SUPPLEMENTAL REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT with the District Court, whch shall 
contain the proceedings requested in the Notice of Appeal, but shall not duplicate any 
proceedings included in the Reporter's Transcnpt filed in prior appeal No. 32090. Further, the 
exhibits submitted in prior appeal No. 32090, which were returned to District Court on March 
23, 2007, are not covered by this Order and they will not be sent to the Supreme Court unless 11 / / 
specifically requested by the part~es The party requesting any or all of the prior exhibits must !ii iil 
(/I 
I!- 
spee~fically designate those exhibits being requested. The LIMITED C L E W S  REXORD and 
cc: Counsel of Record 
Dislnct Court Clerk 
District Court Reporter 
JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C. 
2 1 3 N. 4" Street 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 8381 4 
Tele,: (208) 664-5891 
Fax: (208) 664-2240 
ISB# 6083 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING 
COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
CASE NO. CV-02-7671 
VS. I AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA 
J. LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
Defendants. I 
TO: The above-named Plaintiff, Capstar Radio Operating Company, and 
i t s  attorney, Susan P. Weeks, and to the Clerk of the above-entitled Court: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named Defendants, Douglas P. Lawrence and Brenda J. 
Lawrence, appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court from orders entered in the above- 
entitled action by The Honorable John T. Mitchell presiding. 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the ldaho Supreme Court, and 
the Orders described in paragraph one ( 1 )  above are appealable Orders under 
and pursuant to Rule 1 1 (a) of the ldaho Appellate Rules. 
3 .  Several primaryordersareappealed in this appeal, including the 
February 6, 2008 order granting Plaintiff's renewed motion for summary 
judgment, together with the trial court order denying Defendants renewed 
motion for disqualification for cause. 
4. The primary issues presented by this appeal include, but are not 
limited to, the following: 
(a) Was it an abuse of  discretion to permit Capstar to substitute 
Spectracite as the real party in interest? 
(b) Did the trial court abuse its discretion by refusing to disqualify itself 
for cause? 
(c) In granting Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, are the 
findings of the trial court supported by substantial and competent 
evidence? 
(d) Did the trial court abuse i t s  discretion by granting Plaintiff 
prejudgment access to Defendants land without first requiring a 
bond or undertaking? 
(e) Did the trial court abuse its discretion in granting Defendants only 
two weeks to complete their discovery? 
(f) Did the trial court abuse its discretion by admitting Plaintiff's 
affidavits in their entirety over Defendants' objections? 
(g) Did the trial court abuse its discretion by excluding Defendants' 
affidavits? 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
5. (a) A reporter's transcript has been requested and the required 
fees will be paid on determination of an estimated cost. 
(b) The Defendants request the preparation of  the following 
transcripts of hearings before the Court from Court Reporter, Julie Foland: 
- June 13, 2007: Hearing re: Renewed Motion 
for Summary Judgment; Motion 
for Enlargement of Time; 
A p p l i c a t i o n  f o r  O r d e r  
Shortening Time; Motion for 
Disqualification for Cause; 
Motion to Strike Portions of 
Affidavit Douglas Lawrence; 
Motion to Strike Affidavit of 
John Mack 
- August 6, 2007: 
- August 7, 2007: 
Hear ing re:  Mo t ion  f o r  
Reconsideration; Motion for 
Permission to Appeal from an 
Interlocutory order 
Hear ing  re :  Mot ion  f o r  
Summary Judgment; Motion for 
Enlargement of Time; Motion 
to strike; Request for Judicial 
Notice; Motion to Strike All 
Whelan's Motions 
- October 31, 2007: Hearing Re: Motion to Shorten 
Time and Application for Sixth 
Access 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 6 :j 
- November 27, 2007: Hearing re: Renewed Motion 
for Disqualification for Cause; 
Motion to Substitute Real Party 
in Interest; Renewed Motion to 
Appeal from an Interlocutory 
Order; Motion to  Continue Trial 
6. The Defendants request that the Clerk's record include the 
documents specified in subsection (b)(l) of Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules 
as well as the following documents: 
(a) Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and renewed motion for 
summary judgment all affidavits submitted in support of  the motion. 
(b) Defendants' briefs in opposition to the various motions for summary 
judgment and all affidavits offered by Defendants in support of  the opposition 
to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. 
(c) Defendants' renewed motion to disqualify for cause and all 
supporting briefs and affidavits. 
(d) Defendants' original motion to disqualify for cause and all 
supporting briefs and affidavits. 
(e) Defendants' motion for enlargement of time and the briefs and 
affidavits in support. 
(f) Plaintiff's motion to substitute real party in interest, together with 
all briefs and affidavits in support. 
(g) Defendants' opposition to Plaintiff's motion to substitute real party 
in interest together with all briefs and affidavits in support of the opposition. 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4 
7 .  Defendants further request that the District Court Clerk forward 
exhibits that have been offered in the course of  the various motions before the 
District Court that are, in whole or part, the subject of  the instant appeal. 
Defendants further request that any exhibits forwarded to the Supreme Court be 
identified in a Clerk's certificate accompanying the Clerk's record. Specifically, 
the District Court Clerk is request to forward the following exhibits: 
(a.) The original Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in Support of Defendants 
Lawrences9eply in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 
March 23, 2004, filed March 23, 2004 in Case CV-02-7671. 
8. 1 hereby certify: 
(a) That a copy of this Notice of  Appeal has been served on the 
Clerk of the District Court. 
(b) That a request has been made with the Clerk of  the District 
Court for a determination of the estimated fee for the transcript cost. 
(c) Said fee will be paid upon determination of the appropriate 
amount, 
(d) Service has been made on all parties required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 20 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
DATED this day of April, 2008. 
JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C. 
John P. Whelan 
Attorney for Defendants 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 5 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the q&ay of  April, 2008 I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of  the foregoing by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to the following: 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
Attorneys at Law 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur dl Alene, ID 8381 4 
Via: 4U.S .  Mail, postage prepaid 




324 West Garden Ave. 
P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur dlAlene, ID 8381 6-9000 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid Via: 
Facsimile: 
Personally served 
John P. Whelan 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
1 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING 1 




vs 1 CIVIL CASE NO. 
) CVO2-767 1 
DOUGLAS P LAWRENCE and 1 
BRENDA J LAWRENCE, 1 
1 
Defendant/Appellant 1 
I, DANIEL J. ENGLISH, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that the attached list 
of exhibits is a true and accurate copy of the exhibits being forwarded to the Supreme 
Court of Appeals. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY that the following documents will be submitted as exhibits to the 
record: 
1. Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in Support of Defendant Lawrence's Reply 
in opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said court 
at Kootenai County, Idaho this j 3 day of 3AA - ,2Om 
Daniel J English 
Clerk of District Court . , 
By: 
In the Supreme Coud of  the State of  Idaho 
GAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING 
COMPANY, 
) ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) AUGMENT THE WCORD 
1 
v. ) Supreme Court Docket No. 35 120-2008 
) Kootenai County Docket No. 2002-7671 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. ) 




A MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD AND STATEMENT IN SUPPORT 
THEMOF was filed by counsel for Respondent on May 8,2009. Therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEMBY IS ORDERED that Respondent's MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD 
be, and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation record shall include the documents listed 
below, file stamped copies of which accon~panied this Motion, as EXHIBITS: 
I .  Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, file-stamped 
March 9,2004; and 
2. Affidavit of Kelvin Brownsberger, file-stamped April 6,2004. 
DATED this h of May 2009. 
For the Supreme Court 
cc: Counsel of Record 
IN THE S U P P E M E  COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
GAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING 
COMPANY, a Delaware corporation 
PlaintiffIRespondent, 
VS 
DOUGLAS P. LAWWNCE and 
















I, Daniel J. English, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing 
record in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is 
a true, full and correct record of the pleadings and documents under Rule 28 of the Idaho 
Appellate Rules. 
I further certify that exhibits were offered in this case. 
I certify that the Attorneys for the Appellant and Respondent were notified that the 
Clerk's Record was complete and ready to be picked up, or if the attorney is out of town, 
- 
the copies were mailed by U.S. mail, postage prepaid. on the ,I day of 
I do further certify that the Clerk's Record will be duly lodged with t l~e  Clerk of the 
Supreme Court. 
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court at 
- i 
i 
Kootenai County, Idaho this -3 "-{ day . ,2008. 
' \ 
DANIEL J. ENGLISH 
Clerk of the District Court 
A L  I Rv: 
- J  - 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE SUPPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPEMTING 
COMPANY, a Delaware coqoration 
DOUGLAS P. LAWEWNCE and 
BRENDA J. LAWRENCE, husband and 
wife, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
SUPREME COURT NO. 
35120 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Daniel J. English, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that I have personally 
served or mailed, by United States mail, one copy of the Clerk's Record to each of the 
Attorneys of record in this cause as follows: 
JOHN P WHELAN 
2 13 N 4th Street 
Coeur d3Alene ID 838 14 
SUSAN WEEKS 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d' Alene ID 838 14 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have unto set my hand and affixed the seal of the 
said Court this ' day of ,2008. 
Daniel J. English 
Clerk of the District Court 
